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INSURANCE - IMMUNITY FROM SUBROGATION - A cred-
itor under a conditional sales agreement, for whose bene-
fit the debtor obtains insurance on the property sold, is
not considered a named insured under the policy for pur-
poses of immunity from subrogation under Texas law.
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron,
805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986).
On April 19, 1979, a helicopter owned and operated by
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. (Rocky Mountain)
crashed near Darby, Montana, killing both the pilot and
copilot.' The accident occurred as the helicopter hauled
logs attached to the belly of the helicopter by a cable.2
The helicopter was destroyed.3
Rocky Mountain first leased the destroyed helicopter
from Bell Helicopters Textron (Bell), then four months
before the crash, exercised an option to purchase the
equipment.4 The conditional sales agreement used by
Bell required the purchaser to obtain insurance. 5 In ac-
I Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907,
909 (10th Cir. 1986).
2 Id. at 909-10. The helicopter's monitoring equipment included a digital
meter that provided the weight of the transported logs to the pilot. When the
accident occurred, the helicopter was hauling a log weighing 9,650 pounds. This
exceeded the "external load limitation" by 1,660 pounds. Appellant's Opening
Brief at 11, Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805
F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Appellant's Opening Brief].
Brief for Appellee at 9, Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v Bell Helicopters
Textron, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. The re-
placement cost at the time of the accident was $1,364,250.00 Id.
4 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 909. In 1976, Rocky Mountain's fleet
of forty-nine helicopters included twenty-five manufactured by Bell. Appellant's
Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 6.
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 909. The pertinent provision of the
sales agreement stated "that Purchaser, as long as the contract is in effect, shall
keep such personal property insured with approved companies in such amounts
and against such hazards as the Seller may require,for the benefit of the Purchaser and
Seller as their interests may appear ...... Brief for Appellee, supra note 3, at 8 (empha-
sis added). Rocky Mountain's prior lease with Bell also contained a provision re-
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cordance with the conditional sales agreement, Rocky
Mountain added the new helicopter to an existing hull
loss insurance contract with Southeastern Aviation
(Southeastern) for the benefit of both Rocky Mountain
and Bell.6
The parties' dispute involved the interpretation of two
endorsements included in the insurance policy. 7 En-
dorsement 13 included a breach of warranty clause that
covered Bell, as lienholder loss payee, for losses even if
Rocky Mountain's coverage became void due to some
negligent act.8 Under this provision, and based on this
loss payee coverage, Bell claimed to be insured under the
policy for purposes of immunity from subrogation.9 Bell
reasoned that as an insured under the breach of warranty
clause, it was immune from a subrogation suit by South-
eastern.' 0 Endorsement 30, added at a later date, re-
served for Southeastern the right of subrogation against
quiring the purchase of insurance "acceptable to Bell and naming both Lessee
and Bell as full insureds to the extent of their respective interests in the helicopter
with a breach of warranty clause in favor of Lessor. Id. at 7.
,1 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 909.
7 Id. at 910. "[Mlatter may be added to, and become a part of, a contract of
insurance by way of indorsements .... 1 M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D
§ 4:32 (rev. ed. 1984). "The policy and its indorsements ... together form the
contract of insurance, and are to be read together to determine the contract actu-
ally intended by the parties." Id. at § 4:36.
8 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910. The breach of warranty endorse-
ment stated that "no subrogation shall impair the right of the Lienholder to re-
cover the full amount of his claim." Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 5.
"A breach of warranty endorsement creates an independent contract of insurance
between the lienholder and the insurer.... The primary purpose of the endorse-
ment is to protect the lienholder's interests against the breach of conditions of the
policy by the acts of the mortgagor." Avemco Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Bank & Trust
Co., 613 S.W.2d 436, 438 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
0 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910. Bell argued that the breach of
warranty clause was like a Standard or Union Mortgage Clause which "creates an
independent contract of insurance between the lienholder and the insurer." Ap-
pellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 22. (quoting Avemco Ins., 613 S.W.2d at
438).
I( Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910. "No right of subrogation can
arise in favor of the insurer against its own insured, since by definition subroga-
tion arises only with respect to the rights of the insured against third persons to
whom the insurer owes no duty." 16 M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D.
§ 61:136 (rev. ed. 1983).
1988] CASENOTES AND STATUTE NOTES 1001
Bell. " Based on this provision, Rocky Mountain and
Southeastern claimed that Bell waived its right to immu-
nity from subrogation.12
Rocky Mountain and Southeastern sued Bell (as the
manufacturer) in the United States District Court for the
District of Utah for damages resulting from the crash.' 3
They alleged that a cracked trunnion 4 caused the acci-
dent.' 5 Bell responded by claiming that an inexperienced
pilot caused the accident.' 6 The trial court submitted the
" Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910. During the time Rocky Mountain
leased the helicopter, insurance policy 613 covered the helicopter. In October
1976, Southeastern unilaterally amended the policy with a subrogation reserva-
tion in endorsement 33. Policy 865 was the policy which covered the helicopter at
the time of the crash. Policy 865 included a subrogation reservation in endorse-
ment 30 which was identical to endorsement 33. The Southeastern employee re-
sponsible for Rocky Mountain testified that the subrogation endorsement was not
included in any of Rocky Mountain's previous policies. In addition, "no memo-
randum notice was sent to any of the manufacturer-mortgagees whose interests
were affected by the endorsement." Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 7.
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910. Endorsement 30 stated that
"[T]he provisions... are for the convenience of all concerned and
not for the purpose of insuring the following against any loss for
which the following would have been liable as manufacturer [or]
vendor . . . had the aircraft or any part thereof been sold by the
following free of any security interest prior to loss.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 3, at 5.
1' Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910. This was a diversity action and
Texas law controlled. Id. at 909.
14 Id. at 910. The trunnion is the part of the helicopter which connects the mast
to the rotor blades. Id.
'. Id.
[S]oon after installation of this trunnion the normal operating loads
encountered during logging caused the initiation of the fatigue crack
which progressively got larger. On the day of the accident the crack
was approaching a critical size and the condition in which the re-
maining good portions of the trunnion were no longer capable of
supporting the loads that were imposed upon it. On the final flight
either just prior to the log release, or just after the log release, the
trunnion split open causing a loss of the main rotor system, control
of the aircraft and it impacted with the ground.
Brief for Appellee, supra note 3, at 16 (testimony of Appellee's expert witness).
16 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910.
Bell attempted, but was not permitted, to show that Rocky MTN [sic]
knew or should have known not only that [the pilot] was a reckless
pilot, which explains the pick-up of the overweight load and failure
to immediately release it, but also that [the pilot] was undertrained
and not yet qualified as a command pilot, which would have ex-
plained the pilots' inability to handle the forces generated in the he-
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case to a jury, which returned a special verdict finding
Rocky Mountain forty-five percent negligent and Bell
fifty-five percent negligent.' 7
The district court accepted Bell's argument that under
the breach of warranty clause, Bell, as loss payee, was an
insured for purposes of immunity from subrogation.' 8
The court, however, also accepted Rocky Mountain and
Southeastern's argument that even if Bell was an insured
under the policy, Bell waived its right to immunity from
suit in Endorsement 30.19 The district court ruled in
favor of Rocky Mountain and Southeastern based on a
finding that Southeastern successfully reserved the right
of subrogation against Bell.20
Bell appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
stating that the district court erred in holding that Bell
waived its right to immunity from subrogation through
Endorsement 30.21 Rocky Mountain and Southeastern
cross-appealed on the basis that the district court erred in
holding that Bell, as loss payee, was an insured under the
policy.22 Although the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's ruling in favor of Rocky Mountain and Southeast-
ern, they overruled the lower court's holding that Bell
qualified as an insured under the breach of warranty en-
dorsement. 23 Held, affirmed: A creditor under a condi-
tional sales agreement, for whose benefit the debtor
licopter [when he was forced to make an emergency release of the
log].
Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 13.
17 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910. "In an action to recover damages
for negligence resulting in personal injury, property damage or death ... a claim-
ant may recover damages only if his percentage of responsibility is less than or
equal to 50 percent." TEX. CIv. Piic. & REM. CODE ANN. art 33.001(a) (Vernon
Supp. 1988).




22 Id. at 911.
23 Id. "We need not reach Bell's argument that it did not waive its immunity
because, while we agree with the trial court that Bell was covered by Endorsement
13, we agree with Rocky Mountain and Southeastern that Bell was not an immune
insured party under Texas law." Id.
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obtains insurance on the property sold, is not considered
a named insured under the policy for purposes of immu-
nity from subrogation under Texas law. Rocky Mountain
Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907
(10th Cir. 1986).
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Doctrine of Subrogation
The doctrine of subrogation first developed in equity
courts as a means to reimburse an innocent party who
paid the debt of another. 2' The origin of the word "sub-
rogation" is believed derived from the Latin term subro-
gare, which translated is "to put in place of another" or
"to substitute. ' 25 The doctrine became a legal fiction by
which equity courts treated an extinguished debt as still
existing for purposes of repaying an innocent party.2 6
Subrogation in the insurance field serves as a means of
preventing an insured from recovering money from both
an insurer and a negligent third party2 7 for a property
loss. 28 After paying proceeds to the insured, the insur-
ance company acquires any cause of action the insured
has against a negligent party and can sue the negligent
party for reimbursement. 29 The insurance company is the
24 16 M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d, supra note 10, at § 61:20. "Subro-
gation is an established branch of equitable jurisprudence, being a creature of the
courts of equity, and having for its basis the doing of complete and perfect justice,
without regard to form, in all cases where the equities demand it." Id.
2 R. HORN, SUBROGATION IN INSURANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE 12 (1964).
21 I. TAYLOR, THE LAW OF INSURANCE 20 (3d ed. 1983). "At common law, it was
necessary that an insurer, who had become subrogated to the rights of its insured,
sue the wrong-doing third person in the name of its insured." Id.
27 16 M. RHODES, supra note 10, at § 61:18. "A sounder approach to the prob-
lem is that a wrongdoer who is legally responsible for the harm should not receive
the windfall of being absolved from liability because the insured.., had the fore-
sight to obtain ... insurance .... Id.
211I. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 21. "Subrogation is found only in insurance af-
fecting property losses. Life and accident insurance are not ... contracts of in-
demnification but rather of investment .. " Id.
29 Id. at 20.
Let us suppose that Smith's automobile is damaged to the extent of
$600.00 as a result of a collision with another automobile negli-
gently operated by Brown. If Smith is insured by a collision insurer,
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subrogee (the party to whom the insured's right of action
against the negligent party passes), and the insured is the
subrogor (the party whose rights are taken by the
subrogee).30
B. Limitations on the Doctrine of Subrogation
An insurer can claim subrogation only against third par-
ties to whom it owes no contractual duty.3' As a result,
there can be no subrogation action against a named in-
sured who causes his or her own negligent loss. 32 When a
negligent party (insured by Company A) causes his or her
own loss, or when a negligent party (insured by Company
A) causes loss to another party (also insured by Company
A under a completely separate contract) the insurance
company has no right to a subrogation claim. 3 To allow
an insurer to subrogate itself against its named insured
would permit the insurer to secure a judgment with funds
collected through premium payments, and would pass the
risk of loss to the insured.34 This would constitute judicial
approval of a breach of the insurer's contractual duty to
the insured.35
The policy reasons behind granting immunity from sub-
rogation to insureds is explained in Stafford Metal Works,
Inc. v. Cook Paint and Varnish Co..36 Stafford Metal involves
he will be paid by it the amount of his damage.... The insurer in
turn will have the right to sue Brown.
Id.
R. HORN, supra note 25, at 14.
Hecker, Subrogation-Potential Defenses, 18 FORUM 615, 621 (1983).
' Home Ins. Co. v. Pinski Bros., Inc., 160 Mont. 219, 500 P.2d 945, 949
(1972).
1 Royal Exch. Assurance of Am. v. SS President Adams, 510 F. Supp. 581
(W.D. Wash. 1981) (insurer could not be subrogated to the rights of its insured
against a negligent carrier because the insurer also insured the negligent carrier
under an unrelated policy); see also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Transport Indem. Co., 180
Mont. 419, 591 P.2d 188 (1979). "[An additional insured is entitled to the same
protection as a named insured." Id. 591 P.2d at 193.
.Home Ins., 500 P.2d at 949.
s., Id. Subrogation against an insured would also "permit an insurer, in effect,
to pass the incidence of the loss, either partially or totally, from itself to its own
insured and thus avoid the coverage which its insured purchased." Id.
- 418 F. Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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an insurer's attempt to defend an insured in a liability
suit, and later sue the same insured in a subrogation ac-
tion to recoup the settlement payment. Continental (the
insurer), through two separate policies, insured Stafford
for fire damage and Cook for liability resulting from prop-
erty damage. 7 Stafford bought some defective urethane
foam insulation from Cook which caused a fire in their
plant. 8 Stafford sued Cook for $145,228.47 in property
damage caused by the fire.39 Under the terms of Cook's
contract, the insurer undertook Cook's defense against
Stafford and settled out of court for $163,774.36.40 After
resigning from Cook's defense, the insurer filed a subro-
gation suit against Cook for the excess $63,774.36 of the
settlement which exceeded Cook's policy limits of
$100,000.00. 4 1
The court held that to allow subrogation in this case
would create severe conflicts of interest which would de-
stroy the insurer and insured relationship.4 2 The court
noted, for example, that the insurer's attorneys did not
conduct any discovery during their defense of Cook, and
that the insurer settled for the full amount of Stafford's
claim with no attempt to negotiate a lesser amount.43 If
the subrogation suit was successful, the insurer would be
in the position to "play favorites" among its insureds.44
The risk of loss, as represented by the excess settlement
payment over the limits of the policy, fell on the insurer.45





42 Id. at 62. "The situation where an insurer attempts to subrogate and sue his
own insured, whom he is obligated to defend, gives rise to so many opportunities
for conflict of interests or misrepresentation of the insured that public policy com-
mands that the insurer be denied the right to do so." Id.
43 Id. at 63.
44 Id.
45 Id. "Such subrogation creates administrative costs in shifting the loss be-
tween insurance carriers, which costs must be borne by the public in the form of
increased insurance rates . . . . Clearly, minimizing such costs is in the public
interest." Id. at 62.
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Identifying an insured for purposes of immunity from
subrogation is not always as straight forward as identify-
ing a company's named insureds. For example, many
auto insurance policies cover additional parties driving a
car with the consent of the named insured.46 Additional
insureds are granted the same protection as a named in-
sured.47 No right of subrogation exists, therefore, against
a negligent unnamed driver with the status of an addi-
tional insured under the policy.48 Determining whether an
additional party is an insured for purposes of immunity
from subrogation becomes even less clear in situations
where the named insured gives the benefit of the insur-
ance coverage to a third party.49 Two common examples
are insurance contracts which include a standard mort-
gage or loss payee clause, and builder's risk insurance.
1. The Standard Mortgage Or Loss Payee Clause
A standard mortgage clause defines the rights of benefi-
ciaries under the policy. An insurance contract with a
standard mortgage clause provides that the proceeds are
paid first to the mortgagee (the lender) to protect the
lender's interest in the insured property. 50 The standard
mortgage clause also provides that the lender's interest
will not be invalidated by any negligent act or omission by
the insured borrower. 5' The clause creates a separate and
independent contract between the lender and the in-
4, I. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 74. "This clause insures third persons operating
a vehicle with the consent of the insured and as a result, protection is given not
only to the named insured but also to these 'additional insured.' " Id.
17 See cases cited supra note 33.
48 See supra note 46.
49 Hecker, supra note 31, at 621. "The issue is whether the party receiving the
benefit of another's insurance becomes an "insured" so that the subrogated car-
rier is precluded from proceeding against it to recover for losses sustained by the
named insured." Id.
.10 Nelson v. Consumers County Mut. Ins. Co., 326 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959). "The proceeds of [the) policy [become] the property of the mortgagee and
[are] payable to it to the extent of the amount due on the mortgage. The expres-
sion 'as its interest may appear' is defined as the indebtedness the morgagor owes
under his note and mortgage." Id. at 538.
." I. TAYLOR, supra note 26, at 57.
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surer.5 2 A lender's interest in insured property under a
standard mortgage clause is similar to a vendor's interest
under a conditional sales contract which requires the pur-
chaser to obtain insurance for the benefit of the vendor.53
When a policy is made payable to a conditional vendor
"as his interests may appear", the vendor's interests are
protected because the proceeds apply first to discharge
the remaining debt.54
Although a loss payee is deemed to have a separate and
independent contract with the insurer, it is unclear
whether the loss payee is considered an insured for all
purposes under the policy. In Dalrymple v. Royal-Globe In-
surance Co. , the court held that a lender, named as loss
payee in an insurance policy, is not as a matter of law an
insured under the policy for purposes of immunity from
subrogation. 56 In Dalrymple, the builder of an apartment
complex became a lender when he financed and sold the
complex.5 7 To protect the builder/lender's interest, the
sales agreement required the purchaser to obtain insur-
ance on the complex naming the builder/lender as loss
- 10A M. RODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2D § 42:736 (rev. ed. 1982). The stan-
dard mortgage clause "constitutes two separate contracts of indemnity which re-
late to the same subject matter, but cover distinct interests therein, and it effects a
new and independent insurance which protects the mortgagee... and which can-
not be destroyed or impaired by the mortgagor's acts .... " Id.; see Federal Ins.
Co. v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 117 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1941) (a mortgage clause
created a separate contract between the insurer and the mortgagee, and the in-
surer must assume the risk of mortgagee's negligence).
.'. Eastern Restaurant Equip. Co. v. Tecci, 347 Mass. 148, 196 N.E.2d 869, 871
(1964).
5 M. RHODES, COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d, § 29:109 (rev. ed. 1984).
Where the conditional vendor is entitled to the proceeds he must
apply them to the discharge of the purchase price, as the risk of loss
as between the parties to the sales contract is on the vendee....
[W]here title ha[s] passed to the buyers but part of the purchase
price remain[s] unpaid ... the proceeds... should first be applied on
the unpaid purchase price and the remainder should be turned
over... to the purchasers.
Id.
.55 280 Ark. 514, 659 S.W.2d 938 (1983).
- 659 S.W.2d at 940. "A loss payee is not an insured in the usual sense of the
word but simply a loss payee who is entitled to payment for loss of his prop-
erty. . .. " Id.
.7 Id. at 939.
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payee.58 After a fire in an occupied apartment, the insurer
paid the builder/lender, as loss payee, for damage caused
by the fire.5 9 The apparent cause of the fire was faulty
wiring near a water heater.6 °
The party renting the apartment at the time of the fire
later brought suit against the owner of the complex for
damage due to the fire.6 ' The insurer, acting under its
right of subrogation in the owner's policy, filed a third
party suit against the builder/lender based on negligent
construction due to faulty wiring.62 The builder/lender
defended with a suit against the insurance company for
breach of contract.63 The builder/lender, as loss payee
under the policy, claimed to be an insured who was im-
mune from subrogation. 64
The court's analysis focused on the difference between
coverage under property insurance and coverage under li-
ability insurance.65 The court reasoned that although a
loss payee clause creates a separate contract between the
insurer and the lender, the lender's rights under a prop-
erty insurance policy are limited to payment for loss of
property. 66 The loss payee provision, according to the
court, did not make the lender an insured for purposes of
immunity from subrogation.67 The court concluded that a




Id. At a later date, the renters amended their complaint to seek punitive
damages against the builder/lender. A jury awarded the renters $6,000.00 com-
pensatory damages and $7,500.00 punitive damages, finding 85% attributable to




' Id. at 940. "A loss payee is entitled to enforce his right to payment for prop-
erty loss against the insurer, but there the right ends; it does not grant immunity
to a loss payee that causes the loss." Id.
I Id. The builder/lender "did not buy the insurance, he was simply a named
loss payee, and there is no provision in the policy that provides that a loss payee is
given any liability protection." Id. at 939.
67 Id. at 940. The dissent argued that "[t]o allow the.., insurance company to
recover by subrogation against its own insured is but to encourage all insurers to
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protection.6 8
In General Insurance Co. of America v. Stoddard Wendle Ford
Motors,69 the court reached a different result by holding
that a loss payee under a property insurance policy is a
"coinsured" and is immune from subrogation.7 ° Stod-
dard Wendle Ford Motors (Stoddard) financed and sold a
truck to Findley under a conditional sales agreement.7 '
Findley, in accordance with the terms of the sales agree-
ment, procured insurance from General Insurance Com-
pany of America (General) with Stoddard named as loss
72payee. Because Findley planned to use the truck in a
logging operation, Stoddard lengthened the truck's wheel
base by cutting the body and welding in an additional
section. 3
When Findley later used his truck to haul a tractor, the
welded section of the truck separated, causing the truck
and tractor to go over an embankment.74  General paid
the $6,874.00 required to repair the truck. 75 Later Gen-
eral, as subrogee of Findley, brought suit against Stod-
dard for the $6,874.00 in damages caused by defective
welding.76 The court noted that an insurer can only be
subrogated to the rights of the insured against a negligent
third party, not a negligent coinsured.7 7
Because the insurance was maintained for Stoddard's
benefit, Stoddard became a "party beneficially interested
look for negligence on the part of their insureds and, if found, refuse to pay a
claim otherwise covered by the contract." Id.
' ld.
67 Wash. 2d 973, 410 P.2d 904 (1966).
70 Id. 410 P.2d at 908.
" Id. at 905.
I d. Stoddard assigned its interest to Pacific Finance Corp., who later reas-
signed the interest back to Stoddard. The insurance actually named Pacific as loss
payee, but the court held that Pacific was a mere agent of Stoddard. The insur-
ance policy was for the benefit of Stoddard. Id. at 905, 907.
7. Id. The original wheel base of 191 inches was lengthened to 212 inches. Id.
74 id. at 905-06.
7. Id.
7, Id.
77 Id. at 906, 908.
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in the insurance" and not a "third party."' 78 Stoddard's
sales contract required Findley to purchase the insurance
for which Stoddard received the benefit of the insurance
proceeds. 79  Although Stoddard's negligent welding
caused the damage, the insurance was for Stoddard's ben-
efit and made Stoddard a coinsured who was immune
from subrogation.8 °
2. Builder's Risk Insurance
The issue of immunity from subrogation also arises in
the field of builder risk insurance.8' Under this type of
policy, a general contractor purchases insurance to pro-
tect against losses which may occur during construction. 2
These policies usually extend coverage to unnamed sub-
contractor's property "as their interests may appear." '83 A
dispute can arise when an insurance company compen-
sates a named insured general contractor for a loss, and
then tries to recover under a theory of subrogation
against a negligent subcontractor.8 4 There is disagree-
ment among courts on the issue of whether the negligent
subcontractor is an insured for purposes of immunity
from subrogation.8 5 The court's interpretation of a
builder's risk policy determines whether a subcontractor
is considered an insured. 6
a. Majority View: Immunity From Subrogation
A majority of courts hold that a subcontractor is an in-
71 Id. at 908.
79 Id.
- Id.
", Id. The court noted, "Cases in which an insurance company attempts to re-
cover as a subrogee, against a party for whose benefit the insurance was written
and whose negligence has occasioned the loss, are concededly rare, but there are
some (mostly in the field of builder's risk insurance)." Id.
"2 Comment, Conflicts Regarding the "No Subrogation Against Insured" Rule, 29
DRAKE L. REV. 811, 812 (1979).
-. Id.
84 Hecker, supra note 31, at 623.
Id. at 624.
"' Comment, supra note 82, at 812.
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sured for purposes of immunity from subrogation. 7
Under this reasoning, the insurer cannot seek recovery
from a negligent subcontractor who causes a loss. In
Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Gage Plumbing,8 the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the un-
named subcontractor was an insured for purposes of im-
munity from subrogation. In Transamerica, the general
contractor, who was building a motel complex, purchased
an insurance policy that covered all temporary structures,
materials, and equipment on the site for which the general
contractor was liable.8 9 During construction a fire de-
stroyed one of the buildings which held a subcontractor's
supplies and equipment.90 After paying out proceeds for
the damage caused by the fire, the insurer brought a sub-
rogation suit against the subcontractor alleging that the
subcontractor's negligence caused the fire.9'
In their analysis, the court looked to the customs and
practices of the building trade and determined that the
parties intended the subcontractor to be a coinsured
under the policy.92 The court interpreted the policy to be
a single contract covering all the property on the prem-
ises.9 3 The insurer assumed the risk that one of the in-
sured subcontractors might cause negligent damage. 4
The court put the burden of limiting the subcontractor's
coverage on the insurer through the use of "clear and
17 Id. at 817; see also Frank Briscoe Co. v. Georgia Sprinkler Co., 713 F.2d 1500,
1504 (11th Cir. 1983) (builders risk insurer could not maintain a subrogation
against a negligent subcontractor for damage caused by a leaking fire sprinkler
system); Baugh-Belarde Constr. v. College Util., 561 P.2d 1211, 1216 (Alaska
1977) (builder's risk policy is viewed as one policy which protects both the insured
contractor and any insured subcontractors against their own negligence).
88 433 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1970).
I8 d. at 1053.
"H Id.
9, Id. at 1052.
:" Id. at 1053-54.
113 Id. at 1055. "[Tlhe beneficiaries of the policy could collect only the amount
of their losses, but this does not change the policy from being a single policy
covering all the property on the premises in which the insurance company as-
sumed the risk that one of its insureds might cause damage to the insured prop-
erty through negligence." Id.
s- Id.
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concise" language in the policy.95 Because no language
limiting liability appeared in the policy, the court held that
the parties intended that the policy cover the subcontrac-
tor as an insured with immunity from subrogation.9 6
b. Minority View: No Immunity From Subrogation
A minority of courts allows an insurer to seek a subro-
gation action against a negligent subcontractor.97 The
minority view admits that the subcontractor can be a lim-
ited insured under the policy. The result depends on the
courts' analysis of whether the subcontractor is insured
for property damage only, and therefore not immune
from subrogation, or whether the subcontractor is also in-
sured against liability for negligence. 98 Under the minor-
ity view, if the subcontractor is insured for property
damage only, the insurer can recover from a negligent
subcontractor any amounts paid to an insured general
contractor.99
McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France, Inc., I°° is
representative of the minority view.' 0 t This was a case of
first impression in Texas on the issue of subrogation
rights of an insurer against a negligent subcontractor. 1 2
In McBroome, the insurance company issued builder's risk
, Id. "A limitation of coverage can be accomplished only by the use of clear
and concise language." Id.
96 Id.
:1 Comment, supra note 82, at 824.
"Id.
By automatically labeling the subcontractor as an insured and
thereby strictly construing the contract against the insurance com-
pany, the contract changes from one covering the general contrac-
tor's liability for the subcontractor's property to one covering the
subcontractor's negligence to others. This process does violence to
the rule which prohibits courts from making a new contract for the
parties.
Id. at 826-27.
in, Id. at 827. "The subcontractor should not be permitted immunity from sub-
rogation actions because of its limited interest in a portion of the property which
was destroyed because of the subcontractor's admitted negligence." Id.
1- 515 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
'll Comment, supra note 82, at 824.
"" McBroome, 515 S.W.2d at 35.
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insurance to the owner-general contractor on a construc-
tion project. ° 3 The contractor hired a plumbing subcon-
tractor.1 0 4  During construction, fire damaged the
building. 105
The general contractor filed a claim under its insurance
policy.' '6 The insurer paid $15,719.37 to cover the
loss. 10 7 The insurer then sued the plumbing subcontrac-
tor, as subrogee to the general contractor's cause of ac-
tion, alleging the subcontractor's negligence caused the
fire. 10 The subcontractor defended by claiming immu-
nity from suit as an unnamed coinsured under the insur-
ance contract.'o9
The court focused its analysis on the "realities" of the
situation."0 The disputed provision provided coverage
for "property of the [insured] or property for which the
[insured] is liable.""' The court noted that the subcon-
tractor paid no premiums, was not hired when the policy
was issued, and was not a party to the contract between
the general contractor and the insurer." 2 The subcon-
tractor's only right under the policy was to receive pay-
ment for loss of its property where the general contractor
was liable for the loss."13 In addition, the general contrac-
I Id.
Id.




The case was submitted to the court without ajury .. and the court
rendered judgment against the subcontractor and in favor of [the
insurer] for the amount of the loss, denied the subcontractor's claim
for its tools, but allowed the counterclaim against [the general con-
tractor] for the balance due for plumbing services.
Id.
,I Id.
1 Id. at 37. "The true relationship of the parties should be carefully examined
in the light of the foregoing rules of law." Id.
i-l Id.
1" Id. at 39. "It must be borne in mind that any possible nexus between the
subcontractor and the insurer under this policy is his tools and property at the site
for which [the general contractor] is liable, while the nexus in the subrogation
action is his negligence to the property of another." Id. at 38.
11I ld. at 37.
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tor required the subcontractor to carry "sufficient insur-
ance to fully protect his work."'"1 4 The court found that
the "realities of the case" indicated that the parties did
not intend for the subcontractor to be a coinsured under
the builder's risk policy." 5
The dissent interpreted the language of the policy dif-
ferently. According to the dissent, the language "prop-
erty for which the [insured] is liable" did not refer to
liability for loss, but rather property for which the general
contractor was responsible." 6 The general contractor
was responsible for equipment and supplies present at the
construction site, including the equipment of the negli-
gent subcontractor." 7 The subcontractor, insured under
the policy, became a coinsured for purposes of immunity
from subrogation." 18
II. ROCKY MOUNTAIN HELICOPTERS, INC. V. BELL
HELICOPTERS TEXTRON
The district court decision held that Bell, as loss payee,
was an insured for purposes of immunity from subroga-
tion." I9 The district court, however, did not rule in favor
114 Id. at 39. "[T]he subcontract ... seems to provide ample evidence that [the
general contractor] was not going to insure the subcontractor's interest and it was
not intended that the subcontractor would automatically become a full-fledged
insured under the original policy." Id.
1. Id.; Cf Stafford Metal Works, Inc. v. Cook Paint and Varnish Co., 418 F.
Supp. 56 (N.D. Tex. 1976). "McBroome is a limited decision dealing with a particu-
lar type of insurance policy. There are no Texas cases in point that lead this
Court to belive that a Texas court would abandon the traditional prohibition
against an insurer suing his own insured ..... Id. at 61.
-; McBroome, 515 S.W.2d at 42.
117 Id. "[Tihe subcontractor's property.., including their tools located on the
premises, was covered regardless of whether or not [the general contractor] was
'liable', in the strict legal sense for this particular loss." Id.
I1 d. at 45.
The insurer, which has accepted one premium covering the entire
property and has assumed the risk of the negligence of each insured
party, ought not to be allowed to shift the risk to any one of them.
The entire loss should be borne by the insurer, just as if all the prop-
erty covered by the contract were owned by a single insured party
whose negligence caused the loss.
Id. at 44.
"l Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d
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of Bell because it believed Bell contractually waived its
right to immunity from subrogation through endorsement
30 of the policy. 20 On appeal Bell argued that the district
court erred in holding Bell waived its right to immu-
nity. 21 Bell claimed that endorsement 30 was void due to
lack of consideration and mutuality. 122  Rocky Mountain
argued on appeal that the district court erred in finding
Bell an insured for purposes of immunity from subroga-
tion. 23 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit never
addressed Bell's claimed nonwaiver of immunity because
the court ruled that Bell, as loss payee under Texas law,
was not an insured for purposes of immunity from
subrogation. 2 4
The Tenth Circuit examined several lines of reasoning
to reach their conclusion that Bell was not an insured. 25
First, the court reviewed Bell's argument that a standard
mortgage or breach of warranty clause creates a separate
and independent contract between the lender and the in-
surer. 26 Bell claimed, as loss payee of a standard mort-
gage clause, that a separate contract of insurance existed
between Southeastern and Bell. 27 The court responded
there were limits to the "fiction" that a standard mortgage
clause operates as an independent contract. 28 The court
907, 910 (10th Cir. 1986). "The district court was understandably influenced by
[the builder risk cases] and by the 'separate contract' fiction in finding that Bell
was an insured party under the policy and thus immune from a subrogation action
by Southeastern." Id. at 912.
1211 Id. at 910; see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Rock Mountain's insurance policy.
121 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 910. Bell also appealed an evidentiary
ruling which excluded evidence that Rocky Mountain's pilot was untrained and
reckless. Id.
22 Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 2, at 25-26. "[Tlhere was absolutely
no consideration ever given by Southeastern for End. 30 [sic] ... such as a reduc-
tion in premium, which would have been appropriate since the ultimate risk of
loss would be reduced by the purported right to sue the financing manufacturer in
subrogation." Id. at 27.
12-1 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 911.
12 Id.
125 Id. at 911-13.
12 Id. at 911; see supra notes 50-68 and accompanying text.
127 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 911.
128 Id.
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cited Dalrymple ' 29 as authority that at least one court lim-
ited the "fiction" of the separate contract.' 30 In addition,
the court stated that Bell did not cite any cases where this
"fiction" frustrated the right of subrogation.' 3'
Bell argued, in its brief, that Stoddard Wendle132 repre-
sented a case where a court held that a standard mortgage
clause created a separate contract and frustrated the in-
surer's right of subrogation. 33 The court gives no indica-
tion of why it dismissed this argument. 134 By citing only
to Dalrymple, the court dismissed a line of reasoning and
presentation of facts surprisingly similar to those
presented by Bell.' 35 Like the lender in Stoddard Wendle,
Bell required the purchase of insurance under a sales con-
tract, and at all times the insurance was maintained for
Bell's benefit.1 6  Under the Stoddard Wendle court, these
facts make the lender an immune insured for purposes of
subrogation. 37
The Tenth Circuit next examined the analogous
"builder's risk cases."'' 38 Although these cases were "in-
structive," the court noted there is disagreement as to the
.... 280 Ark. 514, 659 S.W.2d 938 (1983); see supra notes 55-68 and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of Dalrymple.
Id.; see supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 911. "It is nowhere clearly estab-
lished and we find no examples in the cases cited by Bell that this fiction of an
independent contract has been applied to facilitate or frustrate a right of sub-
rogration." Id.
1.'2 67 Wash. 2d 973, 410 P.2d 904 (1966); see supra notes 68-80 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of Stoddard Wendle.
- Appellant's Reply Brief at 9-12, Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell
Helicopters Textron, 805 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1986). [hereinafter Appellant's Re-
ply Brief].
,.4 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 911. The court merely stated it found
no examples in Bell's cited cases. Id.
- Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 133, at 9. "Stoddard Wendle is significant
because, of the many cases precluding subrogation against an insured, its facts
most closely parallel those of the instant case." Id.
,li See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
117 General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Stoddard Wendle Ford Motors, 67 Wash. 2d 973,
410 P.2d 904, 908 (1966). "'Co-insured,'.. . does not apply only to named in-
sureds, but to all for whose benefit the insurance was written." Id.
1.1 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 912; see supra notes 81-118 and ac-
companying text.
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outcome of this issue between jurisdictions. 3 9 The Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that in Transamerica 140 it held that a
subcontractor under a builder's risk policy is an insured
for purposes of immunity from subrogation. 4 ' This deci-
sion, however, represented Louisiana and Kansas law, not
Texas law. 142 The court erroneously cited Dalrymple as an
example of a builder's risk case where a court found there
was no immunity from subrogation. 43 The insurance pol-
icy in Dalrymple was not a builder's risk policy which cov-
ered unnamed subcontractors, but rather a property
insurance policy purchased as a requirement of a condi-
tional sale contract.144 This blurring of loss payee and
builder risk cases is a determinative factor in the court's
decision.
In applying Texas law to the case, the court uses Mc-
Broome,' 45 a builder's risk case, as authority for the holding
that a loss payee is not immune from subrogation. 46 For a
second time, the court blurs the distinction between loss
payee and builder risk cases. The court admitted its deci-
sion was a "close call". 47 A builder's risk policy is a spe-
cific type of insurance which defines the insured interests
of a subcontractor's work and tools. 48 This is vastly dif-
', Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 912.
14o 433 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1970); see supra notes 88-96 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Transamerica.
14 Id.; see supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
142 Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 912.
' Id. "[T]he court in Dalrymple recognized a distinction between property cov-
erage and liability insurance. It found that while the builder's risk policy insured
the contractor's property on the premises, it did not insure the contractor against
all damages to the building that might result from his negligence." Id.
114 Dalrymple, 659 S.W. 2d at 939. "The contract for sale required that the pur-
chaser obtain insurance on the property for 'loss by fire and other hazards and
contingencies.' " Id.
,4 515 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); see supra notes 100-118 and accompa-
nying text.
'4,' Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 805 F.2d at 914. "As to Bell's interest in the heli-
copter, such interest is analogous to the contractor's interest in its lost tools in
McBroome. This interest does not make it an insured party under Texas law." Id.
47 Id. at 913. "Applying the McBroome approach to our facts to determine if
Bell is an insured party, we believe that the 'realities' present something of a
double image lending support to both sides." Id.
14- Hecker, supra note 31 at 623-24.
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ferent from a loss payee's interest under an insurance pol-
icy, which is written for the benefit of the loss payee. In
summary, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
that under Texas law, the loss payee of an insurance pol-
icy which is purchased as a requirement of a sales agree-
ment, is not an insured for purposes of immunity from
subrogation. The Tenth Circuit, however, did not ade-
quately resolve the issue when it based its decision on the
holding of a builder's risk case.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Rocky Mountain stands as authority in Texas for the
proposition that a lienholder, or loss payee, under an in-
surance policy is not an insured for purposes of immunity
from subrogation. 49 The Tenth Circuit based its decision
on the holding in McBroome.150 The McBroome court em-
phasized the "realities" of the case by focusing on the in-
tent of the parties.151 There were two types of property
covered in McBroome, the general contractor's property
and property, such as the subcontractor's tools, for which
the general contractor was liable. 152 The court reasoned
that because the general contractor required the subcon-
tractor to purchase separate insurance, the parties did not
intend the general contractor's insurance to cover the
subcontractor. 53
In Rocky Mountain, the helicopter represented the only
property covered under the policy. 54 Both Rocky Moun-
tain and Bell had insurable interests in the same prop-
erty.' 55 Since Bell required Rocky Mountain to purchase
insurance for the benefit of both parties, the parties ap-
pear to have intended that Bell be an insured under the
policy. If McBroome controls, the "realities" of the case in-
'4 See supra notes 119-148 and accompanying text.
I Id.
McBroome, 515 S.W.2d at 37.
1.2 Id.
1 Id. at 39.
, See supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text.
it, Id.
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dicate that Bell is an insured under the policy for pur-
poses of immunity from subrogation.
The Tenth Circuit did not use other Texas authority as
a guide to understanding the limits of the McBroome case.
In Stafford Metal,'5 6 a different Texas court interpreted Mc-
Broome as a "limited decision" dealing only with an analy-
sis of builder's risk policies. 15 7 The "realities" of the
McBroome decision were that a subcontractor's property
was not covered under the general contractor's insurance
policy. 158 This is vastly different from the facts of Rocky
Mountain where Bell's interest in the helicopter was in-
sured. The Stafford Metal court concluded there were no
Texas cases that indicate a willingness, on the part of
Texas courts, to allow an insurer to sue an insured.' 59
The holding in Rocky Mountain affects any lender in
Texas who is named loss payee under an insurance policy.
Apparently, neither the intent of the parties, nor the rea-
sons for which the insurance was purchased control. One
result is that in order to protect their interests, lenders
will be forced not only to require that a purchaser obtain
insurance, but also that under the policy the lender is
named as an additional insured. This will significantly
raise the cost of insurance for the purchaser based on the
increased risk of insuring the loss payee.
When a lender requires the purchase of insurance with
a standard mortgage, or loss payee, clause the insurer is
put on notice that the insurance is being purchased for
the benefit of a third party. If the insurer is in a jurisdic-
tion that grants immunity from subrogation to a loss-
payee, the insurer can adjust the premium payments ac-
cordingly to reflect any added risk it may incur. The
amount of risk would probably vary depending on the
type of property that is insured.
With the differing interpretations between jurisdictions
'r"i See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
157 Stafford Metal, 418 F. Supp. at 61.
' Id. at 60.
I' Id. at 61; see supra note 115.
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of whether a loss payee is an insured for purposes of im-
munity from subrogation, statutory guidance is needed.
For example, in a jurisdiction which recognizes a loss
payee as an immune insured, the insured's cost for ob-
taining insurance can increase.160 This result will pass the
cost of subrogation onto the public. Insurers are in the
business of risk distribution. Insurers should be responsi-
ble for the added risk of a loss payee clause.
CONCLUSION
The issue presented in Rocky Mountain is whether a loss
payee, for whose benefit insurance is purchased, is an in-
sured for purposes of immunity from subrogation. The
scarce authority on this issue is divided over the outcome.
The basic issue is whether the risk of loss should fall on
the loss payee, or on the insurer. A line of cases that in-
volve a similar issue are builder risk cases. In these cases,
an insurer of a builder's risk policy attempts to recover for
damage caused by a negligent subcontractor. The out-
come turns on a factual determination of whether the sub-
contractor's tools and work are insured under the general
contractor's blanket policy. In Texas, based on the hold-
ing in McBroome, a negligent subcontractor is not immune
from subrogation unless specifically named as an insured
under the general contractor's policy. The Tenth circuit
used McBroome as authority for holding that a loss payee
of an insurance policy is also not immune from subroga-
tion. Under Texas law, therefore, the loss payee of an in-
surance policy, purchased as a requirement of a sales
agreement, is not an insured for purposes of immunity
from subrogation.
Catherine Stone Bowe
-1 K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK, INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC
POLICY 154 (1986).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - CAB POLICIES CONCERNING
CLASSIFICATION AND COMPETITIVE STATUS OF FOREIGN AIR
CARRIERS - The Civil Aeronautics Board may, with ap-
propriate explanation, alter its prior policies to encourage
competition between foreign and domestic airlines, with-
out fear ofjudicial interference. Japan Air Lines Co. v. Dole,
801 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
Discount passenger fares and freight rates form the
substantive basis of this dispute.' On October 27, 1980,
Japan Air Lines Company (JAL), Lufthansa German Air-
lines (Lufthansa), and Swissair, Swiss Air Transport Com-
pany (Swissair) filed a complaint with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB or the Board) 2 challenging a sys-
tem of discount fares marketed by several domestic air-
lines as Visit USA (VUSA).3 The complaint involved the
restrictive nature of the fares that were available only to
passengers who flew to and from the United States on the
carrier offering the discount fare.4
In May of the following year, JAL' filed a second com-
plaint, challenging a discount freight offer by Northwest
Airlines, Inc. (Northwest).5 Northwest's Export Inland
Contract Rate (ExIn rate) gave a discount for freight
'Japan Air Lines Co. v. Dole, 801 F.2d 483, 483-84 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
2 While the CAB ceased to exist on January 1, 1985, its orders remain in effect
and are administered by the Secretary of Transportation. Legal actions concern-
ing the orders continue with the Secretary substituted as the respondent. See CAB
Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, § 12(e), 98 Stat. 1703, 1711 (1984).
Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 484. The VUSA fares provided passengers visiting
the United States from a foreign country with a discount on their travel to various
points within this country. Id. at 484-85. Domestic airlines which intervened in
the action included Pan American World Airways, TransWorld Airlines, and
Northwest Airlines. Id. at 483.
4 Id. at 485. "Unrestricted" VUSA fare systems, which allowed a passenger to
choose different carriers for his foreign and domestic travel, Were not challenged.
Id.
Id. There were no restrictions imposed as to carrier or tariff rate for the Seat-
tle to Far East leg of the shipment. Id.
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flown from Chicago's O'Hare airport to Seattle, so long as
the freight was ultimately shipped to Hong Kong, Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines, or Taiwan.6
The complaints were consolidated, and three major is-
sues took shape.7 The VUSA fares and ExIn rate were
challenged first on the theory that they involved foreign
air transportation and should therefore be filed in the do-
mestic carriers' international tariffs. Secondly, the foreign
carriers alleged that the discounts were contrary to bilat-
eral treaty guarantees of a fair and equal opportunity to
compete with domestic carriers.8 Finally, the complaints
charged that the fares were unjustly discriminatory be-
cause they gave undue or unreasonable preference to do-
mestic carriers in the foreign leg of travel.9 Taken
together, the three charges expressed the foreign carriers'
concern that unregulated discounts could force foreign
carriers, unable to match rates, out of a lucrative market.10
An Administrative Law Judge held the initial hearing
and determined that the discounts did involve foreign air
transportation, but that they did not deny the foreign car-
Id.
7 Id. A carrier must file a tariff, a public document announcing rate ceilings, for
any through fare representing foreign air transportation. See infra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text for the definition of foreign air transportation for tariff filing
purposes.
I Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 485. The guarantees of fair and equal opportuni-
ties to compete are found in the applicable Civil Air Transport Agreements. See,
e.g., Agreement on Air Transport Services, Aug. 11, 1952, United States-Japan,
art. 10, 4 U.S.T. 1948, 1953, T.I.A.S. No. 2854, at 7 (stating, "there shall be fair
and equal opportunity for the airlines of both Contracting Parties to operate the
agreed services on the specified routes between their respective territories.").
11 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 485. The foreign carriers charged unjust discrimi-
nation under the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1982), which pro-
vides in pertinent part:
No air carrier or foreign air carrier shall make, give, or cause any
undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, port, locality, or description of traffic in air transportation
... to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prej-
udice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.
49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1982).
, Visit USA Fare/Export Inland Contract Rate Investigation, Order 84-8-55
(CAB Aug. 10, 1984) (opinion and order on discretionary review) [hereinafter
CAB Order]. Foreign carriers viewed the discounts as examples of below-cost
pricing and cross-subsidization by domestic carriers. Id. at 33.
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riers a fair and equal opportunity to compete and were
not unjustly discriminatory." On requests by both par-
ties, the CAB reviewed the Administrative Law Judge's
decision in its order of August 10, 1984.12 The Board up-
held the initial findings with one exception, ruling that the
ExIn rate involved only domestic and not foreign trans-
portation.' 3 The foreign carriers petitioned for further
review in the District of Columbia Circuit, challenging
each ruling in the CAB order except the VUSA foreign
classification, and charging that the CAB by this order had
unfairly modified its policies.' 4 Held, affirmed: The Civil
Aeronautics Board may, with appropriate explanation, al-
ter its policies to encourage competition between foreign
and domestic airlines, without fear of judicial
interference.
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A petition challenging an administrative order that re-
states an agency policy triggers procedural and substan-
tive questions for the reviewing court. It must determine
whether the agency has met its statutory mandate to
change policies in a way that is not arbitrary and capri-
cious, and that is supported by substantial evidence. To
make the determination, the court must substantively in-
vestigate the agency's policy as it was, and as it has
changed.
A. Judicial Review of Agency Policies or Rulings
The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes federal
Administrative Law Judge John M. Vittone announced his initial decision on
June 3, 1983. Id. at 2.
2 Id. at 3.
' Id. at 3. The CAB ruled ExIn rates domestic for filing purposes because they
involved no restrictive combinations with any one carrier on the Far East segment.
See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text for discussion of the Board's
reasoning.
,4Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 485.
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courts of appeal to review administrative orders.' 5 This
statute allows the reviewing court to decide all relevant
questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action.1 6 In particular, the statute
outlines the circumstances under which a court shall set
aside agency actions.' 7
1. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard
A court will set aside agency actions, first, if they are
arbitrary or capricious.' 8 The courts have defined a nar-
row scope of review under the arbitrary and capricious
standard because of the deference traditionally given to
an agency in interpreting its own rules.' 9 A court will not
simply substitute its own judgment for the agency's.20
When the agency's action reflects a change in policy,
however, the reviewing court's deference becomes condi-
tional. The Supreme Court described this conditional def-
erence in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State
Farm Mutual,2 I a case involving the National Highway
Safety and Transportation Administration (NHSTA) deci-
sion to rescind the requirement that new cars produced
after September, 1982, include passive restraints.2 2 In
Motor Vehicle, the Court acknowledged the deference due
an agency, but outlined the agency's responsibility to sup-
,-, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982). The scope of review section was part of the original
Administrative Procedure Act ofJune 11, 1946.
- Id.
17 Id. Subsection (2) of 5 U.S.C. § 706 in relevant part mandates the reviewing
court to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law, or ... (E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case ...
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." Id.
8 Id. § 706(2)(A).
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983);
American Fin. Servs. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Castle, 657 F.2d 275, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
20 See Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43.
21 Id.
' Id. at 34. The court held that NHSTA's rescission of passive restraint re-
quirements was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 56-57.
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ply a "reasoned analysis" for a changed policy. 2 3 This jus-
tification must be sufficient to enable the reviewing court
to conclude that the agency has examined the relevant
data and articulated a satisfactory explanation for its ac-
tion.2 4 To affirm a policy change under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, the court must have confidence that
the change is the product of reasoned decision-making by
the agency.25 In Motor Vehicle, the Court said NHSTA's
failure to justify fully one abandoned alternative meant
that the agency had failed to give sufficient explanation
for its changed policy. 26
This requirement that an agency provide a reasoned
analysis for changing its course forms the basis of the ar-
bitrary and capricious test. In Airmark Corp. v. FAA, 2 7 a re-
view of a Federal Aviation Administration procedure, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals said that analysis
was the minimum requirement of an agency failing to ad-
here to its own precedents.2 8 Similarly, in American Finan-
cial Services v. FTC,29 a review of the Federal Trade
Commission's credit practice rules, the same court said
that before it could affirm an agency's decision, the
agency must show that its decision was based on a consid-
eration of the relevant factors and that there had been no
2 Id. at 42. The analysis required is "beyond that which may be required when
an agency does not act in the first instance." Id.
24 Id. at 43. A satisfactory explanation must include a "rational connection be-
tween the facts found and the choice made." Id.
2-. Id. at 52.
26 Id. The Supreme Court disallowed NHTSA's recession of the passive re-
straint requirement because the agency had not sufficiently explained its abandon-
ment of the continuous passive safety belt as a required safety feature. Id. at 56.
For an analysis of the Motor Vehicle decision as a significant reaffirmation of the
"hard look" approach to reviewing agency actions, see The Supreme Court, 1982
Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1, 230-38 (1983).
27 758 F.2d 685 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (calling for an analysis which indicates "that
prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ig-
nored," (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971))).
28 Id. at 692. The FAA procedure at issue involved granting exceptions to regu-
lations imposing noise standards on four-engine jet aircraft in commercial opera-
tions. Id. at 687.
2s, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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clear error of judgment by the agency. °
2. The Substantial Evidence Test
Along with the arbitrary and capricious standard, the
Administrative Procedure Act requires the reviewing
court to apply a substantial evidence test when an agency
changes its prior policies.3 In Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB,32 the Supreme Court defined substantial evidence
as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might ac-
cept as adequate to support a conclusion. '33 The Court
stressed that substantial evidence must be more than a
scintilla. 4 Offering a veritable treatise on the substantial
evidence rule, Universal Camera deals with an attempt by
the NLRB to force Universal Camera to reinstate an em-
ployee terminated for filing charges under the Wagner
Act. 5 Courts reviewing agency actions have consistently
relied on these definitions for more than thirty years.36
The Supreme Court added procedural clarity to Univer-
sal Camera's definitions in American Textile Manufacturers In-
Id. at 985. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of what factors are rele-
vant in Motor Vehicle:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to
consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the prob-
lem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to difference in view or the product of agency expertise.
Id. at 43.
.I See supra note 17 for text of the statutory mandate of a reviewing court.
12 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
.3 Id. at 477. The Court said that substantial evidence:
must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to
be established ... It must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a
jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be
drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.
Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 199, 229 (1938)).
.1 Id.
- Id. Writing for the majority, Justice Frankfurter identified the "essential is-
sue" as the procedural one of determining "the effect of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act . . . on the duty of the Courts of Appeals when called upon to review
orders of [an agency.]" Id. at 476.
.- See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 417 U.S. 283, 292
(1974); FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, 400-01 (1958); American Fin. Servs.,
767 F.2d at 985.
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stitute Inc. v. Donovan.3 7 American Textile encompassed the
cotton industry's challenge to the Occupational Safety
and Health Administrations' Cotton Dust Standard, which
limited occupational exposure to the dust which induces
brown lung disease. 3 This decision requires the review-
ing court to take into account contradictory evidence in
the record.3 9 The possibility of drawing two inconsistent
conclusions from that record, however, does not prevent
an agency's finding from being supported by substantial
evidence. 40 The court will intervene only in what ought to
be the rare instance when the substantial evidence test ap-
pears to have been misapprehended or misapplied. 4 1 The
proper inquiry for a reviewing court, then, is not whether
it would find the results the agency did on its own.
Rather, the court must ask whether there is substantial ev-
idence to support the agency's results. When there is sub-
stantial evidence, the agency's decision will stand.42
B. CAB Policies and Rulings
Within this procedural framework, the court reviewing
new administrative policies must analyze the policies sub-
stantively. The questions here include what law has gov-
erned agency action for each issue, and what test has been
used to measure actions against the law. Changes in
either the law or the test will result in judicial scrutiny.
1. Classification as Foreign Transportation
Generally, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 governs the
classification of a carrier's activity as foreign air transpor-
-7 452 U.S. 490, 541 (1981) (holding that the Court of Appeals did not misap-
prehend or grossly misapply the substantial evidence test when it upheld the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Administration's Cotton Dust Standard).
- Id. at 500.
- Id. at 523.
40 Id. The Supreme Court had previously allowed such inconsistent conclu-
sions to support a substantial evidence finding in Consolo v. Federal Maritime
Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
4 American Textile, 452 U.S. at 523.
42 Greater Boston Television, 444 F.2d at 853 (upholding FCC criteria used for
renewal of a television station's license).
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tation.43 This act defines foreign air transportation as
"carriage by aircraft of persons or property as a common
carrier for compensation or hire or the carriage of mail by
aircraft, in commerce between ... a place in the United
States and any place outside thereof. ' 44 Once transporta-
tion has been classified as foreign, the carrier must file a
tariff disclosing its rate ceilings publicly so that the rates
can be scrutinized by the governments involved.4 5
Traditionally, the CAB determined which rates were to
be filed using a "flow of commerce" test.46 This test dis-
tinguishes between kinds of transportation by considering
the essential character of the movement. The subjective
intent of the airline user, whether passenger or cargo
shipper, is determinative. If the user aims his movement
at a foreign destination, then the trip is properly charac-
terized as foreign air travel. 7
One of the first official retreats from this traditional test
appears in the CAB's Tariff Flexibility Rulemaking.48 An-
swering challenges from foreign carriers concerning re-
vised domestic fare filing procedures, the Board stated
that the carriers were seeking too broad an interpretation
of foreign transportation.49 Tests of foreign status must
comply, the Board said, with the intent of Congress 5 and
4.1 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
4 49 U.S.C. § 1301(24) (Supp. 1987).
4. See CAB Order, supra note 10, at 28, explaining that the basic purpose of the
bilateral tariff-filing requirement is "to provide formal review and approval proce-
dures in the case of essentially international fares." Id.
4 See, e.g., Canadian Colonial Airways, Inc. - Investigation, 2 C.A.B. 752, 755
(1941) (holding that one U.S. stopover between non-U.S. stops did not remove
the flight from foreign classification when the stop was merely an incidental part
of the whole trip to the ultimate destination).
47 See Eastern Air Lines Inc., Enforcement Proceeding, 40 C.A.B. 745, 747
(1964), in which the Board states, "as a general rule, the destination which was
intended by the passenger when he begins the journey and which was known to
the carrier and for which he purchased a ticket determines the character of the
trip."
48 46 Fed. Reg. 46,878 (1981) (outlining a flexible system of domestic fare filing
for the deregulation transition period).
I4 d. at 46,791.
Id. at 46,792 (stating that origin-destination criteria have been rejected when
necessary to preserve a fundamental policy of the Federal Aviation Act).
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when classification is not clear, it is best resolved on a
case-by-case basis.5 '
2. Equal Opportunity to Compete
The foundation of relationships between foreign and
domestic airlines are the Bilateral Air Transport Service
Agreements between our government and those of the
foreign carriers. These agreements usually include a ne-
gotiated guarantee to the foreign carrier of an equal op-
portunity to compete with domestic carriers.5 2 Such a
guarantee protects the competitor from the possibility of
an overly protective home government. Ideally, all carri-
ers stand on an equal footing when preparing rates.
Because the treaty power in the United States lies with
the executive branch, the CAB, an executive agency, was
an integral party to these bilateral agreements. As a rule,
therefore, the courts defer to CAB interpretation of treaty
language.5 3 The test the CAB traditionally applied in its
interpretation was whether the foreign carrier is able to
match fares and rates with its domestic counterparts.54
' Id. at 46,791.
-12 Each of these treaties was negotiated by the CAB and a foreign power in
anticipation of air traffic between the two countries. See supra note 8 and accompa-
nying text for equal opportunity provisions. For a discussion of the rule of bilat-
eral agreements after deregulation, see McConnell, The Big Picture, 32 FED. B.
NEWS &J. 28 (1985).
5 Sumitamo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 (1982) (hold-
ing that a U.S. subsidiary of ajapanese company is not covered by the Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation Treaty); see also Collins v. Weinberger, 707 F.2d 1518,
1522 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (acknowledging that:
[n]o treaty can determine all its own applications. Interpretation,
clarification and implementation are always necessary, and it is the
executive branch, in agreement with the other party to the treaty,
which bears primary responsibility for that function. Courts should
defer to such executive actions provided they are not inconsistent
with or outside the scope of the treaty.
Id.)
See, e.g., Air India, Discriminatory Fares, 92 C.A.B. 753 (1981) (holding cer-
tain Air India fares discriminatory because the government of India prevented a
domestic carrier from offering matching fares on a voluntary basis). The match-
ing fare is sufficiently "equal" if carriers can construct it on an interline basis be-
tween themselves. Id.
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3. Unjust Discrimination
Charges of unjust discrimination are, like determination
of foreign statutes discussed above, determined under the
Federal Aviation Act.5 5 Prior to the period of airline de-
regulation,5 6 the test for discriminatory behavior was a
strict "rule of equality. ' 57 In 1980, the CAB's adoption of
the pricing policy set forth in PS-93 substantially liberal-
ized the "rule of equality" test. 58 Under this statement,
unjust discrimination is an unreasonable preference or
prejudice 59 within domestic air transportation. 60 The pol-
icy limits this unreasonable preference, however, to situa-
tions in which four factors are present,6' including an
inability of "actual and potential competitive forces" to
correct the discrimination on their own.62 The authors
clearly believed that the competitive forces unleashed by
domestic deregulation of the airline industry would elimi-
nate discrimination problems. Legislative history of the
policy hints at the compatibility of this competitive ap-
proach with foreign transportation, but the policy as writ-
%5 See supra note 9 for provisions of 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1982).
.59 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
57 CAB Order, supra note 10, at 45-46.
-'" PS-93, 14 C.F.R. § 399.36 (1980) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Except in unusual circumstances or as provided in paragraph (c)
of this section, the Board will find a rate for domestic air transporta-
tion to constitute unreasonable discrimination only if: (1) There is a
reasonable probability that the rate will result in significant long-run
economic injury to passengers or shippers; (2) The rate is in fact
discriminatory according to a reasonable cost allocation or other ra-
tional basis; (3) The rate does not provide transportation or other
recognized benefits that justify the discrimination; and (4) Actual
and competitive forces cannot reliably be expected to eliminate the
undesirable effects of the discrimination within a reasonable period.
(c) A rate that discriminates on the basis of the status of the traffic
carried will not be presumed to be unreasonably discriminatory, un-
less the use of the status categories in question is contrary to estab-
lished national anti-discrimination policy.
Id.
Id. § 399.36(a)(1).
" Id. § 399.36(b).
, Id. § 399.36(b)(1-4).
112 Id. § 399.36(b)(4).
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ten is limited to domestic transportation. 63
While most courts believed these areas of law were well
settled before 1982, the deregulation of the American air-
line industry would challenge the underpinnings of each
of the traditional tests. In 1982, Congress issued a man-
date to the Board to consider maximum reliance on com-
petitive market forces as a matter of public interest.6
This policy of regulating in a pro-competitive fashion
formed the basis for the CAB's policy restatements and
the court's affirmance of those restatements in this case.
II. JAPAN AIR LINES Co. V. DOLE
The decision of the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals in Japan Air Lines Co. v. Dole was a complete victory
for the CAB. The court held that the Board had decided
all three issues correctly. the ExIn rate was properly clas-
sified as domestic transportation, and the discounts did
not deny the foreign carriers an equal opportunity to
compete or unjustly discriminate against the foreign
carriers .65
A. Classification of ExIn Rates
The CAB held that the ExIn rate did not involve foreign
transportation.6 6 In reaching this decision, however, the
63 See 45 Fed. Reg. 36,062 (1980).
- International Air Transportation Competition Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp.
1987). The section states in part:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this
act, the Board shall consider the following... as being in the public
interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and neces-
sity: . . . (4) The placement of maximum reliance on competitive
market forces and on actual and potential competition (A) to pro-
vide the needed air transportation system, and (B) to encourage effi-
cient and well-managed carriers to earn adequate profits and to
attract capital, taking account, nevertheless, of material differences,
if any, which may exist between interstate and overseas transporta-
tion, on the one hand, and foreign air transportation on the other.
Id. § 1302(a)(4). The only matters of public concern listed before competition
were safety and fair service issues. Id. § 1302(a)(1-3).
Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 484.
Id. at 485.
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CAB rejected the traditional "flow of commerce" test,
which relied on the tie to separately ticketed foreign
travel.67 The CAB stated that this test is insufficient, on
its own, to justify international classification for tariff fil-
ing purposes. 68 Such a mechanistic approach is too lim-
ited in its scope of inquiry,69 and would require, if strictly
applied, the filing of any domestic fare which could possi-
bly be combined with a foreign one.7°
Instead, the CAB relied on what it called a "carrier re-
stricted" standard. 7' Rather than the destination of the
user, this test focuses on restrictions the airline imposes
on the fare. If a rate is only available when combined with
another trip on the same carrier, it will have to be filed in
that carrier's tariff.72 But if any airline can offer the rate
on equal terms then it must be economically independent
of the international travel to which it is joined for market-
ing purposes.73 Because the ExIn rate in this case did not
involve any restrictive combinations with any one carrier
on the Far East leg of the shipping excursion, the CAB
found it to be independent, and therefore, not foreign
transportation.7 4
JAL, Lufthansa and Swissair charged that this turn from
the traditional "flow of commerce" test represented in-
consistent behavior by the CAB and was unaccompanied
by adequate explanation.75 The foreign carriers relied on
Motor Vehicle, in which the Supreme Court imposed the
"reasoned analysis" requirement on an agency changing
67 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "flow of
commerce" test.
- GAB Order, supra note 10, at 28.
- Id. at 12.
70 Id. at 24.
71 Id. at 29. The Board chose the "carrier restricted" test as the one most able
to "harmonize" the considerations of domestic deregulation and bilateral tariff-
filing requirements. Id.
72 Id. at 49.
73 Id. at 29.
74 Id. at 48-49.
71Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 486.
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its policies or regulations.76
The court acknowledged this agency obligation, quot-
ing Airmark, with its reminder that an agency which
"glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without
discussion ... may cross the line from tolerably terse to
intolerably mute." 77 The court held, however, that the
adoption of the "carrier restricted" test was not an intol-
erable swerve from its own precedents.7 8 Indeed, the
court said the CAB had never given "unqualified accept-
ance" to the "flow of commerce" test, 79 and found sup-
port for the proposition in the Board's Tariff Flexibility
Rulemaking.80 There, the Board had set out a limited view
of foreign air transportation, and called for classification
on a case-by-case, fact sensitive basis.8' Because of this
support for alternate standards in prior CAB procedures,
the court found that the agency had provided sufficient
explanation for its "not so inconsistent" decision.8 2
B. Equal Opportunity to Compete
The CAB next determined that the VUSA fares and the
ExIn rate were consistent with bilateral agreements guar-
anteeing foreign carriers a fair and equal opportunity to
compete.83 Again, the Board rejected the traditional test
of a foreign carrier's ability to match fares and rates with
the domestic carrier. Instead, the CAB applied a new
76 See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text for a discussion of the require-
ment of a reasoned analysis.
7" Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 486 (quoting Airmark Corp., 758 F.2d at 692.)
78 Id.
79 Id. at 487. The court summarized six CAB cases cited by the foreign carriers
in support of the "flow of commerce" test, and determined that none of them
stated that test was the only applicable test. Id. at 486-87 n.2.
,o 46 Fed. Reg. 46,787 (1981); see supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Tariff Flexibility Rulemaking.
81 46 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1981). The Board acknowledged that within the spec-
trum between purely foreign tariffs and purely domestic fares, "there may be fares
that raise uncertainties: These are best analyzed on a case-by-case basis and in a
specific factual context." Id.
"2 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 488.
8- CAB Order, supra note 10, at 49; see supra note 8 and accompanying text for a
discussion of bilateral agreements.
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standard, which it called "reasonably competitive. '84 The
Board said this standard requires that "foreign carriers
have the opportunity to offer reasonably competitive al-
ternatives to particular inner point fares."8 5 The "reason-
ably competitive" standard hinges, as does the "carrier
restricted" test, on the facts involved. 86 The Board admit-
ted that no simple formula for identifying a violation of
the bilateral provision for fair competition exists.
JAL and Lufthansa challenged this "reasonably compet-
itive" standard as another example of inconsistent behav-
ior on the part of the CAB.8 8 The carriers claimed that
the agency had, in the past, consistently required that car-
riers be able to match fares and rates offered by their
competitors.89
The court rejected this claim. 90 First, the court ac-
knowledged the deference owed an agency that has
helped negotiate an agreement, when that agreement re-
quires interpretation. 9' The court then noted that the
governments of the petitioning carriers had not lodged an
objection to the CAB's interpretation of their treaties.92
Next, the court dismissed the carriers' reliance on prior
decisions alleged to support matching fares and rates
under all circumstances.93 The "reasonably competitive"
standard, it said, was merely an application of the tradi-
" CAB Order, supra note 10, at 36.
95 Id.
so Id.
87 Id. The Board affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's finding that any price
disadvantage suffered by the foreign airlines was "of their own making because
they have not attempted to negotiate prorate agreements to equalize the price for
their passengers." Id. at 34.
"" Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 488.
89 Id.
- Id. at 489.
91 Id. at 488; see also supra note 53 and accompanying text describing the defer-
ence generally given to the CAB's interpretation of its own agreements.
92 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 489. For the court, the silence of foreign govern-
ments apparently implied their recent consent with the Board's treaty
interpretation.
0- Id.; see, e.g.,Air India, 92 C.A.B. 753 (establishing that carriers must be able to
match fares on an interline basis).
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tional rule of interline arrangements9 4 rather than an
adoption of some new test.95
Finally, the carriers protested that they could not find
reasonably competitive alternatives to the VUSA fares and
ExIn rate.96 If such alternatives did not in fact exist, the
court could not uphold the new standard.97 However, the
court held that substantial evidence indicated that com-
petitive alternatives existed, and affirmed the CAB
order.98
C. Unjust Discrimination
In determining that the VUSA fares and ExIn rate were
not unjustly discriminatory, the CAB relied heavily on its
1985 policy statement, PS-93.9 9 This statement refers ex-
plicitly to discrimination in domestic transportation.100
The CAB justified extending its criteria to foreign trans-
portation by referring to the discussion of international
fares in the CAB statement adopting PS-93.' 0 1 In that
statement the agency asserted that many of the fundamen-
tal policy considerations that led to the domestic policy
applied equally to foreign air transportation. 10 2
The petitioning carriers argued against this extension
of domestic policy to an international dispute, calling this
1,4 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 489. Interline agreements require that foreign
carriers can construct competitive rate structures for the entire journey, not sim-
ply for the leg ending at a U.S. point. Id.
95 Id.
"" Id. The carriers claimed, for example, that they could not "prorate" (i.e.
agree to pay a domestic carrier the difference between its ordinary rate and the
lower fare charged the passenger) under their own governmental regulations. Id.
97 See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of substantial
evidence standards and procedures.
1,8 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 489. The court did not explain what substantial
evidence supported the Board's finding that foreign carriers could prorate.
- See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text for the text and a discussion of
PS-93.
1W, See supra note 58.
,0, CAB Order, supra note 10, at 44-45; see 45 Fed. Reg. 36,058, 36,062 (1980),
stating that "[i]n many pertinent respects, the framework [of international pric-
ing] is now similar - if not identical - to the domestic area."
,o2 45 Fed. Reg. 36,058, 36,062. The CAB went on to say that it was studying
this issue, and that it would address the issue in more detail soon. Id.
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use of PS-93 standards arbitrary and capricious. 0 3 The
court, however, upheld the agency's right to change pol-
icy by rule or, as here, by adjudication. 0 4 In doing so, it
cited the legislative history of PS-93 and the willingness
the authors showed to embrace foreign transportation as
well as domestic. 0 5 Perhaps more significantly, the court
also cited the congressional directive to the CAB to regu-
late with a pro-competitive outlook. 0 6 PS-93 represents
this strong pro-competitive view, and the court decided
the single reference to possible expansion was sufficient
to extend the market's forces to discrimination in foreign
air travel. 07
Finally, the court rejected the carriers' claim that this
use of PS-93 was yet another unexplained departure from
precedent. 0 8 The carriers reminded the court that Con-
gress had earlier expressed approval of the state of for-
eign air regulation. 0 9 The court said, however, that such
precedent was not intended to remain untouched
throughout the deregulation process, and the CAB deter-
mination was affirmed."10
103 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 490.
1- Id.; see 1 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 5.01 (1958):
Just as agencies, for developing law on a subject, often have a choice
between proceeding by rule making or by adjudication, agencies also
have a choice, for clarifying the meaning of rules, between amending
the rules and interpreting them. The interpretation may be made in
an adjudication or it may be a mere announcement.
Id. See generally Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965).
-.1 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 490.
1m Id. at 491; see 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (Supp. 1987), requiring the Board in the
public interest, to place "maximum reliance on competitive market forces and on
actual and potential competition."
107 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 491.
108 Id.
-o Id. In a committee report on the Airline Deregulation Act, the committee
expressed its belief that"current Board case law defining unlawfully discrimina-
tory, preferential, and prejudicial carrier prices are [sic] generally satisfactory." S.
REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1978).
110 Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 492.
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III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Japan Air Lines Co. v. Dole is significant for its substantive
and procedural implications. Substantively, each of the
three issues addressed by the court represents a new
statement of (or at least a new way of stating) CAB policy
toward foreign air transportation. Procedurally, the
court, in reviewing a CAB order, appears to have re-
worked its frame of reference for evaluating agency
changes in policy.
The classification of VUSA fares as foreign, accom-
plished through the use of the new "carrier restricted"
test, lII means that airlines must now file those fares under
tariff regulations with the CAB and foreign govern-
ments."l 2 Airlines will not need to file ExIn rates."l 3 As a
result, airlines may expect to open their fares to public
scrutiny whenever they restrict those fares to combination
with particular carriers.
By affirming that these rates did not prevent the foreign
airlines' right to compete, the court clearly stated that
what is promised by the bilateral agreements is not equal
rates. Instead, they promise the reasonable ability to enter
into competition, the results of which are not guaranteed
to be favorable to the foreign carrier. 1 4 Bilateral treaties
will now prevent protection of domestic and foreign air-
lines. Indeed, stress has moved from the word "equal" to
the word "opportunity" in the concept of equal opportu-
I See supra notes 66-82 for a discussion of the classification of rates as foreign
or domestic transportation.
112 CAB Order, supra note 10, at 49. The order directs this filing be done:
within 30 days of the date of service of this order, setting forth the
terms and conditions of all fares and rates for transportation be-
tween or among domestic (or foreign) points which are available
only in conjunction with the purchase and use of air transportation
to and/or from the United States on a specified carrier or carriers.
Id.
", Id. One former CAB member cites foreign interpretation of these classifica-
tions as attempts by the U.S. to apply its law extraterritorially. She sees this as a
major issue of the deregulation period. McConnell, supra note 52, at 31.
,14 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the equal
opportunity to compete.
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nity to compete. If it costs the foreign carriers more to
exercise that opportunity, they will have no recourse
under the treaties.
Finally, the extension of PS-93 to international carriers
significantly limits the situations in which those carriers
can claim unjust discrimination.' 15 Only in cases in which
the market cannot correct discrimination will the CAB
step in and restrain the offensive practice. This means
foreign carriers desiring to compete with domestic carri-
ers will have to weigh opportunities for success on each
route, knowing that unrestrained competition will provide
the framework for those opportunities.
The fact that such expansive changes in CAB policy
were given blanket approval may well indicate a new per-
ception of the court's role in reviewing the agency's deci-
sions. The traditional law on judicial review of an agency's
action is sprinkled throughout the opinion. The court
does not appear to weaken the general presumption
against unexplained agency changes in policy. 16 How-
ever, the court's deference to the pro-competitive changes
embodied in these issues may signal a more free rein for
the interpretation of aviation regulations across the
board. The natural outgrowth of such novel interpreta-
tions" 7 is uncertainty. The effect of that uncertainty in
the airline industry remains to be seen. But in the ex-
treme, if foreign carriers are unable to compete profitably
in the unrestrained market of discount passenger fares
'., See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of unjust dis-
crimination; see also Berger & Mitchell, Predatory Pricing in the Airline Industry: A Case
Study- The Policies and Practices of the CAB, 13 TRANSP. LJ. 287, 305 (1984) (claim-
ing that the policies of PS-93 represent an abdication of regulatory responsibility
because any discrimination charge filed under that policy would have no realistic
change of success).
I- Japan Air Lines, 801 F.2d at 486 (citing Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 41-42).
1,7 See, e.g., id. at 490. The court stated that,
even if the extension of PS-93 to foreign air transportation may be
said to establish a novel rule, inconsistent with prior precedent, we may
not upset such changes unless we are convinced that the agency has
changed course without carefully considering the reasons for, and
consequences of, such a change.
Id. (emphasis added).
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and freight rates, many trans-Atlantic routes may be
abandoned.
It was, perhaps, inevitable that the deregulation of the
domestic airline industry would have a rippling effect
upon its foreign counterpart. The pro-competition spirit
can hardly be fostered completely at home and be shack-
led abroad. Discounts like the VUSA fares and ExIn rates,
in which lines between domestic and foreign aviation are
blurred, were areas ripe for challenges to the traditional
rules. Pointing to the dramatic shift in agency regulation
required by Congress' alteration of the statutory frame-
work within which the Board now operates, this court al-
lowed the CAB to outline sweeping changes in policy.
Despite the uncertainty in international aviation that may
well follow, the court's decision to affirm was consistent
with the congressional mandate for competition. If the
interim period of change does not destroy foreign carri-
ers' business, airline users can look for more consistency
between domestic and foreign airlines' operations, and an
even wider scope of benefits from deregulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Japan Air Lines Co. v. Dole, foreign airlines failed in
three challenges to CAB policy restatements. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that ExIn
rates, unlike restricted VUSA fares, were not foreign
transportation because the rates were not restricted to any
particular carrier in the international leg of the shipping
excursion. The court also ruled that neither of these dis-
counts denied foreign carriers an equal opportunity to
compete. Finally, the court determined that neither dis-
count unjustly discriminated against the foreign carriers.
The court's deference to the CAB's rulings opens the
door to extension of the deregulation process to areas of
the airline industry that touch on foreign transportation.
Airlines will have to expect future Board rulings that en-
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courage the spread of competition throughout the indus-
try, and affirmation of those rulings by the courts.
Linda Althoff
PROPERTY TAX - CONGRESSIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
STATE TAXATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION - An airline
property tax that is wholly utilized for airport and aero-
nautical purposes does not violate the antidiscrimination
provisions of section 1513(d)(3) of the Airport and Airway
Improvement Act. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equali-
zation of South Dakota, 107 S. Ct. 1038 (1987).
Prior to 1978, South Dakota taxed all commercial and
business personal property.' In 1978, South Dakota re-
vised its personal property tax system and exempted from
taxation almost all personal property. 2 South Dakota con-
tinued to tax airplanes because they fell in the category of
centrally taxed property.3
In May 1983, five airlines operating in South Dakota
paid their 1982 flight property taxes under protest.' The
airlines subsequently sued the appropriate county treasur-
ers for a refund of their 1982 property taxes. In a sepa-
rate action, the airlines petitioned the State Board of
Equalization to exempt the airlines' flight property from
their 1983 taxes.5 In both actions the airlines alleged that
I Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d 106, 108 (S.D. 1985),
af'd, 107 S. Ct. 1038 (1987) [hereinafter Hughes County].
2 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-4-6.1 (1982); see infra note 26 for text of this
section.
, See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-29-2 (1982); see infra note 20 for text of this
statute.
4 Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d at 107. The appeal involved the actions of five
airlines: Western Air Lines, Inc.; Republic Airlines, Inc.; Frontier Airlines, Inc.;
Ozark Airlines, Inc.; and Continental Airlines, Inc. Id. Continental Airlines, Inc.
did not join in the appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Western Air Lines,
Inc. v. Board of Equalization of S.D., 107 S. Ct. 1038, 1041 (1987) [hereinafter
Western].
Brief for Appellant at 6-7, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of
S.D., 107 S. Ct. 1038 (No. 85-732) (1987) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief]. In April
1983, each airline requested that the board of commissioners of each of seven
counties abate and refund property taxes after September 3, 1982, the effective
date of the federal statute. Joint Appendix at 17, Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board
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the South Dakota law violated the Airport and Airline Im-
provement Act of 1982 (AAIA) which prohibits assessing
air carrier transportation property at a higher percentage
than other commercial property.6 The various county
commissioners voted unanimously to deny the airlines'
appeal for refund of their 1982 property taxes after they
were advised that the South Dakota tax is an in lieu tax
and therefore not covered by the AAIA. Similarly, the
State Board of Equalization denied the airlines' petition
of Equalization of S.D., 107 S. Ct. 1038 (No. 85-732) (1987) [hereinafter Joint
Appendix]. The suits were commenced pursuant to S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 10-27-2 (1982) which provides that "[alny person against whom any tax is levied
.... who pays the same under protest ... may ... commence an action against
such treasurer for recovery thereof." Id. at 7. Each complaint alleged that the
defendant county had "attempted to levy and collect tax upon the Plaintiff's air
carrier transportation property, and to treat the same differently than similar
property which is otherwise exempt from taxation pursuant to South Dakota stat-
ute, thereby violating the federal statutes .... "Joint Appendix at 8, Western.
(i Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 6-7. Each county answered that the dis-
puted tax "is utilized wholly for airport and aeronautical purposes and is in lieu of
property taxes and is therefore permitted by 49 U.S.C. § 1513(d)(3) (sic)." Joint
Appendix, supra note 5, at 11.
7 Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 6-7. The AAIA forbids a state from assess-
ing or taxing air carrier transportation property at ratios or rates higher than
those imposed on other commercial and industrial property. 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1513(d) (1982).
Section 1513(d) reads as follows:
(1) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce and a State, subdivision of a State, or
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any
of them:
(A) assess air carrier transportation property at a value that has a
higher ratio to the true market value of the air carrier transportation
property than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial
and industrial property of the same type in the same assessment ju-
risdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and
industrial property;
(B) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made
under subparagraph (A) of this paragraph; or(C) levy or collect an ad valorem property tax on air carrier trans-
portation property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable
to commercial and industrial property in the same assessment
jurisdiction.
(2) in this subsection - .
(D) "commercial and industrial property" means property, other
than transportation property and land used primarily for agricultural
purposes or timber growing, devoted to commercial or industrial
use and subject to a property tax levy; ....
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to exempt their airplanes from 1983 taxes, agreeing with
the county commissioners that the South Dakota tax did
not violate federal law.8
The airlines appealed these decisions to the South Da-
kota Circuit Court.9 The court consolidated the actions' 0
and held that the state tax was permissible under the
AAIA.I The airlines appealed the decision to the South
Dakota Supreme Court.' 2 Although it disagreed with the
lower court's reasoning, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision based on its interpretation of other AAIA provi-
sions.13  The airlines applied for and received a writ of
certiorari for review by the United States Supreme
Court.' 4  Held, affirmed: An airline property tax that is
wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes does
(3) This subsection shall not apply to any in lieu tax which is wholly
utilized for airport and aeronautical purposes.
Id.
, Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1042. The Board of Equalization unanimously con-
cluded that the state flight property tax was utilized wholly for airport and aero-
nautical purposes and is in lieu of property taxes and is therefore permitted under
49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d)(3) (1982). Id.
9 Id.
- Hughes County, 372 N.W. 2d. at 107. In all, 42 cases were consolidated from
Brown, Beadle, Davison, Hughes, Pennington, Minnehaha, Codington, and Yank-
ton counties. Id. The lawsuits were consolidated in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in
Hughes County, South Dakota. Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1042. In February 1984, the
circuit court issued a single memorandum decision disposing of these cases. Ju-
risdictional Statement, Appendix B at 13a, Western. The circuit court stated that it
was "not required to delve into the issue of whether this tax is burdensome or
discriminatory .... Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix B at 21a, Western. In-
stead, the circuit court upheld the tax as an in lieu tax permitted under the AAIA.
Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix B at 20a, 21a, Western.
11 Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix B at 20a, 21a, Western. The trial court af-
firmed the Department on the appeal, entered judgment for the counties on the
suits for rebate, and dismissed the airlines' actions on their merits. Id. The trial
court determined that the South Dakota tax is an in lieu tax used solely for aero-
nautical purposes under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d)(3) (1982). Id.
12Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d at 107. The airlines raised two issues on their
appeal. Id. at 108. First, is the South Dakota tax imposed in lieu of another valid
tax so as to be authorized under 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d)(3) (1982)? Id. Second,
does the tax on airplanes discriminate against the airlines in violation of 49 U.S.C.
app. § 1513(d)(1) (1982)? Id.
1" Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d at 109; see infra notes 100-108 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this decision.
'1 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of S.D., 106 S. Ct. 1180
(1986).
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not violate the antidiscrimination provisions of section
1513(d)(3) of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act.
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of South Dakota,
107 S. Ct. 1038 (1987).
I. SOUTH DAKOTA FLIGHT PROPERTY TAXATION
South Dakota's personal property tax system is not
unique. While most personal property is completely ex-
empt from taxation, South Dakota singles out certain
classes of property for taxation.15 This method of taxing
certain personal property while not taxing most other
property is at the heart of the airlines' discriminatory taxa-
tion claim.
The South Dakota Constitution authorizes the legisla-
ture to classify property for taxation purposes.' 6 Each
county is an assessment district which assesses all prop-
erty subject to taxation in that district, except property
the Department of Revenue centrally assesses.' 7  The
South Dakota statutes provide ten different systems of
centrally-assessed taxation with respect to ten different
types of industries.'" These industries include railroads,
private car-line companies, express companies, telephone
companies, telegraph companies, electric, heating, water
and gas companies, rural electric and water supply com-
panies, and pipeline companies.' 9
In 1961 South Dakota imposed a centrally-assessed tax
1.5 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-4-6.1 (1982); see infra note 26 for text of this
statute.
- S.D. CONST. art. XI, § 2. "[T]he Legislature is empowered to divide all prop-
erty ... into classes and to determine what class or classes of property shall be
subject to taxation and what property, if any, shall not be subject to taxation." Id.
17 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-3-16 (1982). "The director of equalization
... shall assess for taxation all property subject to taxation, except property which
the secretary of revenue has been directed to assess .. " Id. Therefore, property
is centrally assessed when the secretary of revenue assesses the property rather
than having each county tax assessor assess the property locally. Id.
-8 Id. §§ 10-28 to 10-37.
19 Id. Each centrally-assessed taxation system operates independently. Id. For
example, some measure the value of property by partial reference to stocks and
bonds. Id. §§ 10-28-13, 10-34-3. Others measure the value of property by refer-
ence to gross receipts. See, e.g., id. §§ 10-31-2, 10-33-11, 10-35-9.
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upon the flight property of all airline companies operating
in South Dakota.20 For property tax purposes, airplanes
are assessed at their "true and full value in money."' 21 A
percentage of value allocable to the state is determined
through a complicated formula that apportions the as-
sessed value of aircraft according to use within and with-
out the state.2 The aircraft is then taxed at up to 60
percent of its state allocated value2 3 and taxed at the rate
paid on all property, both real and personal, within the
state.24 The tax proceeds are allocated to the airports
where the airlines make regularly scheduled landings. The
airports must use these proceeds only for airport
purposes.25
When the South Dakota legislature enacted this tax on
airplanes in 1961, South Dakota also taxed all other busi-
2 Id. §§ 10-29-2, 10-29-8. Section 10-29-2 provides: "Flight property of airline
companies operating in the state shall be assessed for the purpose of taxation by
the department of revenue and not otherwise." The South Dakota Flight Prop-
erty Tax was enacted in 1961. Id. §§ 10-29-1 to 10-29-17. Also in 1961 Congress
introduced the first antidiscrimination tax legislation, making certain property tax
assessments on common carrier property unlawful. See infra note 41 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this legislation.
' S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 10-6-33, 10-6-1(5), 10-29-9 (1982).
22 Id. § 10-29-10. The allocation is based on the use for the preceeding calen-
dar year of air flight property in'the state. The complex equation used to deter-
mine the allocation includes: (1) the ratio of the total tonnage of passengers,
express, and freight received or discharged in the state to the total tonnage of
passengers, express, and freight received or discharged by the company as a
whole, both within and without the state; (2) the ratio of aircraft flight time within
the state to the total aircraft flight time within and without the state; and (3) the
ratio of revenue ton miles of passengers, mail, express, and freight flown by the
company within the state compared to the total flown by the company within and
without the state for the preceding calendar year. Id.
2. Id. § 10-6-33. In 1957 the South Dakota Legislature determined that the
Commissioner of Revenue should not use more than 60% of the property's true
value to compute taxes. Id.
24 Id. § 10-29-14. The property is actually taxed at the average mill rate which
is determined by dividing the total of all state and local taxes levied within the
state for the present year by the total taxable valuation of all property in South
Dakota for the preceding year. Id. The South Dakota Constitution requires uni-
form taxes on all property of the same class. See S.D. CONsT. art. XI, § 2.
2-' S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 10-29-15 (1982). "The taxes imposed by this
chapter shall be allocated by the secretary of revenue to the airports where such
airline companies make regularly scheduled landings and shall be used exclusively
by such airports for airport purposes ..... Id.
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ness-related personal property. In 1978 South Dakota re-
vised its personal property tax system and exempted from
taxation all personal property not centrally assessed. 6
Airline flight property remains taxable because it is cen-
trally assessed by the Department of Revenue.27 Since
South Dakota taxes aircraft and does not tax all other per-
sonal property, the airlines contend that the South Dakota
tax violates the antidiscrimination provisions of the AAIA.
To understand fully the AAIA's purpose and scope, one
needs to have a working understanding of the antidis-
crimination statutes which preceeded AAIA.
II. FEDERAL TAx DISCRIMINATION LAWS -
A TROUBLED HISTORY
A. Legislative History
Pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers,28 Congress
passed legislation protecting rail, motor, and air carriers
2 Id. § 10-4-6.1. Section 10-4-6.1 provides: "Personal property as defined in
§ 10-4-6 which is not centrally assessed is hereby classified for ad valorem tax
purposes and is exempt from any ad valorem taxation. This exemption shall not
impair or repeal any tax or fee authorized to be levied or imposed in lieu of per-
sonal property tax." Id.
Ad valorem is defined as "[a] tax imposed on the value of property. Ad valorem
taxes can . . . be imposed on personal property." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 48
(5th ed. 1979).
27 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-4-6.1 (1982). Central assessment was re-
tained for airlines, railroads, telephone and telegraph companies, electric utilities,
and pipelines. Id. §§ 10-6-34.1, 10-29-2, 10-28-1, 10-33-10, 10-34-8, 10-35-2,
10-37-9. Each of these categories are exempted from the general South Dakota
scheme of local property tax assessment at the county level. Id. § 10-3-16.
28 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The commerce clause of the United States Con-
stitution provides: "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
Id. The commerce clause not only grants power to the federal government to
regulate commerce, but it also limits the states' power to interfere with interstate
commerce. See Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, An Analytical Approach to State Tax Dis-
crimination Under the Commerce Clause, 39 VAND. L. REV. 879, 881 (1986).
For the purpose of this clause, "commerce" is broadly defined. Id. at 887. As
ChiefJustice Marshall stated: "Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is some-
thing more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches .... Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824) (New York law which granted a monopoly in the
steam navigation of its waters was held invalid under the commerce clause). Al-
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against discriminatory state and local property taxation. 29
Congress sought protection for the interstate carriers by
enacting the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Re-
form Act of 1976 (4-R Act), 30 section 31 of the Motor Car-
rier Act of 1980 (Motor Carrier Act), 3' and section 532(b)
of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982
(AAIA). 2 These statutes had a common purpose and
were identical in many of their significant provisions. 33
Congress wanted to protect the rail, motor, and air carrier
industries from states that were placing an unfair tax bur-
den upon them. 4
most any economic activity is now considered commerce. 1 J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATiON 4.1 (1983).
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that Congress may regulate, under
the commerce clause, "any activities except 'those which are completely within a
particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not neces-
sary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government.'" Arizona v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. Co., 656 F.2d 398, 407 (9th
Cir. 1981) (quoting Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964)). Although
states may legitimately tax any commercial activity within their boundaries, the
states' taxing power may not be used to erect barriers to interstate commerce. See
Maltz, The Burger Court, The Commerce Clause, and the Problem of Differential Treatment,
54 IND. L.J. 165, 175-76 (1979); Note, The Constitutional Dilemma of State Tax Excep-
tions: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 13 LAw & PoL'Y IN INT'L
Bus. 811, 818 (1981).
Consequently, the Supreme Court has found a variety of state regulatory and
taxation measures unconstitutional because they unduly burdened interstate com-
merce. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (holding that
state excise tax on alcoholic beverages, which exempted certain locally produced
beverages, was unconstitutional under the commerce clause); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 449 U.S. 1119 (1981) (upholding lower court deci-
sion that California tax exempt statute was unconstitutional under the commerce
clause because it imposed a discriminatory burden on both interstate and foreign
commerce); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318 (1977) (hold-
ing that New York transfer tax on securities transactions was unconstitutional
under the commerce clause because transactions involving an out-of-state sale
were taxed more heavily than most transactions involving a sale within the state).
21, 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503, 11503a (1982); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d) (1982). For a
discussion of this legislation, see infra notes 35-57 and accompanying text.
49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982); see infra note 44 for the text of this statute.
49 U.S.C. § 1503a (1982); see infra note 45 for the text of this statute.
-2 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d) (1982); see supra note 7 for the text of this statute.
3 Note, Discriminatory Demands and Divided Decisions: State and Local Taxation of
Rail, Motor, and Air Carrier Property, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1107, 1108 (1986). By
prohibiting state and local discriminatory property taxes Congress hoped to revi-
talize the rail, motor, and air carrier industries. Id. at 1110.
2- See S. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1972) (quoting S. REP. No.
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Congress developed most of the legislative history dur-
ing the fifteen years prior to the statutes' enactment. The
bulk of the legislative history relates to the railroad indus-
try.35 Legislative history on antidiscrimination tax laws for
motor carriers and air carriers is minimal. 36 The 4-R Act's
legislative history reveals that congressional concern re-
garding discriminatory state property taxes began as early
as 1944. 3 7 This concern primarily arose due to the in-
630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969)). By 1969 Congress recognized a trend toward
classifying interstate carrier property at higher tax rates than other commercial or
industrial property. Id. State courts continued to uphold these discriminatory tax
schemes. See, e.g., Apache County v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 106 Ariz. 356,
476 P.2d 657 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 1005 (1971) (upholding Arizona tax
scheme that assessed railroad property at a higher rate than other property). See
generally Comment, The Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976: Im-
proving the Railroads' Competitive Position, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 575 (1977).
.' See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1395, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3009, 3013-18; S. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 14, 65-66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 14, 79-80; S.
REP. No. 585, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 768, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-190 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 220-23 (1975); S.
REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-10 (1972); S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-27 (1969); S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-27 (1968).
During the 1920s and 1930s the railroad industry suffered greatly due to the
combined effects of the depression and the growth in the trucking and barge in-
dustries. Comment, supra note 34, at 576. Congress enacted the 4-R Act first
because tax discrimination against rail carriers was the most blatant. See S. REP.
No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969). Congress passed the 4-R Act to promote
competition among the railroads and between railroads and other forms of trans-
portation. Comment, supra note 34, at 575. The goal of this legislation was "to
eliminate the long-standing burden on interstate commerce resulting from dis-
criminatory State and local taxation of common and contract carrier transporta-
tion property." S. REP. No. 1483, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1968); see S. REP. No.
630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969). Both of these bills dealt solely with the taxa-
tion issue, which was later made a part of the 4-R Act. Id.
.- See H.R. REP. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2283, 2327. The legislative history of the AAIA is even
more limited than that of the Motor Carrier Act. Congress merely stated that the
AAIA has the same purpose and scope as the Motor Carrier Act. See S. REP. No.
494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
781, 1188.
.17 See H.R. Doc. No. 160, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 124-25 (1944). In 1944 approxi-
mately half the states admitted to Congress that they taxed railroads at a higher
rate than other personal and commercial property. Id. The legislative history in-
dicates that states discriminated against rail carriers through variations in assess-
ment or tax rates. S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1969).
State and local governments also took advantage of certain economic changes
that occurred after World War II to discriminate against railroad carriers. Note,
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creasingly heavy tax burden borne by the railroads, and
the consequently higher costs to consumers.38
During 1959-60 Congress asked a special study group
for recommendations on means to eliminate state and lo-
cal discriminatory taxation of various common carriers.39
The resulting Doyle Report noted that despite state laws
requiring uniform tax treatment, states still discriminated
against common carrier property as compared to other
business property in the same jurisdiction. 40  The Doyle
Report recommended that Congress forbid discrimina-
tory assessments against property owned or used by inter-
state carriers.4'
Over the fifteen years following the Doyle Report, Con-
supra note 33, at 1110-11. At this time market values of most residential and com-
mercial property increased substantially, while carrier property values remained
constant. Id. Nevertheless, neither the residential and commercial property nor
the carrier property increased in assessed value. Id. Therefore, interstate carriers
experienced unfavorable tax consequences. Id.; see also S, REP. No. 445, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 458 (1961).
-" Note, supra note 33, at 1110-11. Congress determined that consumers paid
higher prices for transportation because carriers necessarily passed the cost of
discriminatory taxes on to the consumer. See S. REP. No. 1085, 92nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-4 (1972). Congress anticipated that both the carriers and the consumer
would benefit from laws protecting carriers from discriminatory taxes. See gener-
ally, Comment, supra note 34 (arguing that the 4-R Act restores competition to the
rail carriers).
.- S. REs. 29, 151, 244, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
40 S. REP. No. 445, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 458 (1961). The Doyle Report noted
the deliberate practice of assessing railroad property at a proportion of full value
"substantially higher" than other similar business property. Id.
"A table was submitted by the Association of American Railroads ...
showing the extent of overpayment of railroad ad valorem taxes re-
sulting from the assessment of railroad property at a percent of its
value that is higher than the percent which the assessment of other
taxpayer property is to the value of such other property. This con-
firmed the findings of this committee that there is a studied and de-
liberate practice of assessing railroad property at a proportion of full
value substantially higher than other property subject to the same
tax rates."
Id.
4 Id. The Report noted that adoption of such a proposal "would mark the
assumption of control by Congress in the field of taxation of interstate commerce
so vital to unhampered commerce between the States." Id. at 466.
The Doyle Report actually proposed two methods to help alleviate the tax bur-
den on railroads. Id. at 463-66. The first proposal suggested a right-of-way ex-
emption. Id. at 463-65. The Association of American Railroads made the second
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gress considered a series of legislative proposals that
would have forbidden state tax discrimination, not only
against railroads and pipelines, but against all common
and contract carriers regulated by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.42 Congress ultimately determined
railroad carriers bore the biggest burden resulting from
discriminatory tax practices. 43 In response to these dis-
proposal, which was the basis of section 306 of the 4-R Act which Congress en-
acted fifteen years later. Id. at 465-66.
The Doyle Report indicates that the Association of American Railroads:
proposed Federal law would declare the following action by any
State, or governmental subdivision or agency thereof, whether such
action be taken pursuant to a State constitutional provision, a stat-
ute, an administrative practice, or otherwise, to constitute an unrea-
sonable and unjust burden upon interstate commerce and thereby
forbidden and declared to be unlawful:
(a) The assessment, for the purposes of a property tax levied by
any taxing district, of property owned or used by any common car-
rier engaged in interstate commerce at a value which bears a higher
ratio to the true market value of such property than to the assessed
value of all other property in the taxing district subject to the same
property tax levy bears to the true market value of all such property.
(b) The collection of any tax on the portion of said assessment so
declared to be unlawful.
To provide a forum other than at the State level to decide such
unlawful assessment and collection of taxes it was further proposed
that, notwithstanding the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1341, or of the
constitution or laws of any State, jurisdiction is to be conferred upon
the Federal district courts to enjoin after full hearing, any action de-
clared under the preceding section to be unlawful, such jurisdiction
not to be exclusive of that which any Federal or State Court may
otherwise have.
This proposed antidiscrimination tax bill, which would be avail-
able to all common carriers engaged in interstate commerce, has the
obvious merit of insuring that such carriers would receive equal
treatment with other taxpayers subject to the same tax rates in accord-
ance with applicable State law. The proposal in no way alters the free-
dom of the State to tax its taxpayers as in its discretion it deems best,
so long as such carriers are accorded equal tax treatment with other
taxpayers.
Id.
42 See, S. 2718, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2841, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); H.R. 5385, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1974); S. 1891, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); S. 3945, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 2289, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); S. 927, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967); H.R. 4972, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965); H.R. 1489, 90th Cong. ist Sess. (1967); S. 2988, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1966); H.R. 736, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 7421, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961).
- Note, supra note 33, at 1111. Railroads accounted for ninety percent of the
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criminatory taxes, Congress passed the 4-R Act of 1976. 44
Next Congress similarly protected motor carriers from
discriminatory taxation when it passed the Motor Carrier
Act of 1980.4' The Motor Carrier Act is essentially identi-
cal to the 4-R act.46
discriminatory state and local taxes from 1960 to 1969. S. REP. No. 1085, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972); S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969). The
percentage of excessive taxation in the twenty-one most discriminatory states in-
creased from 37.87% in 1968 to 38.31% in 1970. See S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1969); S. REP. No. 1085, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972).
44 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982). The portion of the 4-R Act which prohibits the
states from discriminatorily taxing transportation property reads as follows:
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce, and a State, subdivision of a State, or
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any
of them: (1) assess rail transportation property at a value that has a
higher ratio to the true market value of the rail transportation prop-
erty than the ratio that the assessed value of other commercial and
industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction has to the
true market value of the other commercial and industrial property.
(2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that may not be made
under clause (1) of this subsection. (3) levy or collect an ad valorem
property tax on rail transportation property at a tax rate that ex-
ceeds the tax rate applicable to commercial and industrial property
in the same assessment jurisdiction. (4) impose another tax that dis-
criminates against a rail carrier providing transportation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission ....
ld.
45 Id. § 11503a. The portion of the Motor Carrier Act which prohibits states
from discriminatorily taxing motor carrier transportation property reads as
follows:
(b) The following acts unreasonably burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce and a State, subdivision of a State, or
authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not do any
of them: (1) assess motor carrier transportation property at a value
that has a higher ratio to the true market value of the motor carrier
transportation property than the ratio that the assessed value of
other commercial and industrial property in the same assessment ju-
risdiction has to the true market value of the other commercial and
industrial property; (2) levy or collect a tax on an assessment that
may not be made under paragraph (1) of this subsection; (3) levy or
collect an ad valorem property tax on motor carrier transportation
property at a tax rate that exceeds the tax rate applicable to commer-
cial and industrial property in the same assessment jurisdiction;
Id.
46 Compare 49 U.S.C. § 11503 (1982) with 49 U.S.C. § 11503a (1982). The Mo-
tor Carrier Act lacks a provision equivalent to the "catch-all" section found in
section 11503(b)(4). This subsection provides that "a State, subdivision of a
State, or authority acting for a State or subdivision of a State may not ... impose
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Finally, Congress gradually began to see the need to
similarly protect airline carriers. First, Congress began
recognizing the need to expand the airport and airway
system. In 1970 Congress requested that the Secretary of
Transportation prepare a plan to develop public air-
ports.4 7 Then Congress adopted the Airport and Airway
Development Act of 1970 (AADA), authorizing the Secre-
tary to make grants to states and localities for airport de-
velopment.48 Congress also established an Airport and
Airway Trust Fund to finance airport expansion and im-
another tax that discriminates against a rail carrier providing transportation sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of the Commission .. " 49 U.S.C. § 11503(b)(4) (1982).
This "catch-all" phrase may indicate that Congress did not intend to limit the 4-
R Act only to property taxes. Despite the fact that the Motor Carrier Act lacks this
"catch-all" phrase, Congress also may not have intended to limit the Motor Car-
rier Act to property taxes. See H.R. REP. No. 1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, re-
printed in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2283, 2327. "The prohibition in
this section against different tax rates is intended to apply to taxes such as those
on real or personal property, general sales taxes, or other levies that are parts of
the general tax structure applicable to a variety of commodities, operations, and
commercial activities." Id.
Despite the conflict between this legislative history and the language of the Mo-
tor Carrier Act as codified, no court has resolved this issue. See American Truck-
ing Ass'ns v. O'Neill, 522 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1981) (concerning the
amendment of a Connecticut statute which required each interstate motor carrier
to pay a forty dollar annual registration fee while other motorists only paid a five
dollar annual fee); American Trucking Ass'ns v. Conway, 514 F. Supp. 1341 (D.
Vt. 1981) (Vermont amended its statutes to require interstate motor carriers to
pay increased permit fees).
Both courts based their decisions on the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982). O'Neill, 522 F. Supp. at 54; Conway, 514 F. Supp. at 1343. The courts held
that permit fees are taxes within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act, but fed-
eral laws do not apply if a state's remedy is adequate. O'Neill, 522 F. Supp. at 54;
Conway, 514 F. Supp. at 1343. The courts never addressed whether the Motor
Carrier Act prohibits discrimination. The decisions did not provide any reason
for their failure to apply the Motor Carrier Act to these situations. O'Neill, 522 F.
Supp. at 54; Conway, 514 F. Supp. at 1343. See generally Note, supra note 33, at
1124-25.
47 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1074, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 3047, 3101. Congress found that "substantial ex-
pansion and improvement [of the airport and airway system] is required to meet
the demands of civil aviation, the postal service, and the national defense." Id.
4N 26 U.S.C. § 4261 (1982). Through this legislation, Congress committed it-
self to assisting states and communities in expanding and improving America's air
transportation system. Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 8
(1983).
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provement projects .4 9
After passage of the AADA and the establishment of the
Trust Fund, states and municipalities questioned whether
they could impose taxes on airlines and air travelers. In
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,5 ° the
Supreme Court ruled that neither the Commerce Clause
nor the AADA prevented state and local authorities from
assessing head taxes on passenger flights at state and local
airports. 5' Following this decision, Congress determined
that the combination of Trust Fund levies and local taxes
unfairly burdened interstate air carriers.52 Therefore,
Congress adopted the Airport Development Acceleration
Act of 1973 (ADAA) in order to limit state taxation of air
carriers.5 3 This statute conferred the same protection to
airlines as previous statutes had conferred to railroads
and motor carriers. 54
In the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982
(AAIA), Congress added section 7(d) to the ADAA. 55
Section 7(d) forbids a state from assessing or taxing air
carrier transportation property at ratios or rates higher
than those imposed on other commercial and industrial
property.56 In tax systems similar to the South Dakota tax
scheme, states discriminated by either taxing air carrier
property while not taxing other commercial property, or
4s, 26 U.S.C. § 4271 (1982).
so 405 U.S. 707 (1972).
, Id. at 720-721.
.12 See S. REP. No. 12, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 20-21 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 157,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1973).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1513 (1982). The ADAA states:
(a) No State... shall levy or collect a tax, fee, head charge, or other
charge, directly or indirectly, on persons traveling in air commerce
or on the carriage of persons traveling in air commerce or on the
sale of air transportation or on the gross receipts derived therefrom
... (b) Nothing in this section shall prohibit a State... from the levy
or collection of taxes other than those enumerated in subsection (a)
of this section, including property taxes, net income taxes, franchise
taxes, and sales or use taxes on the sale of goods or services....
Id.
See supra notes 44-45 for a text of these statutes.
. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d) (1982); see supra note 7 for text of this statute.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d) (1982).
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by varying the tax rates applicable to other commercial
and industrial property.
B. Interpretation of the Statutes
In all three statutes, Congress specifically prohibited
discriminatory state and local property taxation.5 8 The
substantive provisions of the Motor Carrier Act and the
AAIA are based upon the language of the 4-R Act.5 9 In-
terpretation of this legislation requires consideration of
some definitional problems as well as use of established
rules of statutory construction.
1. Commercial and Industrial Property
The statutes forbid states from taxing carrier transpor-
tation property at rates higher than those imposed on
other "commercial and industrial property of the same
type. ' 60 Therefore, the interpretation of the phrase "com-
mercial and industrial property" is central to many dis-
criminatory tax claims.
The definition of "commercial and industrial property"
contained in the statutes has received varying interpreta-
tions from courts construing the statutes.6 1 In all three
-1 See Tatarowicz & Mims-Velarde, supra note 28, at 905-06. Congress declared
that these discriminatory tax practices "unreasonably burden and discriminate
against interstate commerce." Id.; see also S. REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1969). Congress determined that interstate carriers are "easy prey for State and
local tax assessors" since they are "non-voting, often non-resident targets for lo-
cal taxation, and cannot easily remove their right-of-way and terminals." Id.
." See supra notes 28-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of these
statutes.
" See supra notes 45, 7, & 44 for the text of these statutes.
49 U.S.C. §§ 11503, 11503a (1982); 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d) (1982). This is
also referred to as de jure discrimination. Note, supra note 33, at 1119. De jure
discrimination against carriers occurs when a state fails to include various types of
property in the assessment ratio. Id. This results in an assessment rate for a car-
rier that exceeds the average assessment rate of all other commercial and indus-
trial property in the assessment jurisdiction. Id.; see also Burlington N. R.R. v.
Lennen, 715 F.2d 494, 497 (10th Cir. 1983) (discussing dejure discrimination). In
order to violate the 4-R Act and the Motor Carrier Act, the assessment rate for a
carrier must exceed the average assessment rate by five percent. 49 U.S.C.
§§ 11503, 11503a (1982).
- See infra notes 63-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
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statutes, commercial and industrial property is defined as
"property, other than transportation property and land
used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber grow-
ing, devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject
to a property tax levy."'6 2 Much of the confusion centers
on when property is "subject to a property tax levy."
In Ogilvie v. State Board of Equalization of North Dakota,63
interstate railroads contended that imposition of a state
ad valorem tax upon their personal property and not
upon other business taxpayers violated the 4-R Act.64
Specifically, the railroads argued that inclusion of their
personal property in the assessed value of their rail trans-
portation property, while personal property was not in-
cluded in the assessed value of the locally assessed
business property, was discriminatory. 65 The state con-
tended, however, that the 4-R Act did not deny the state
the power to classify property and to exempt certain
classes of property from taxation. 66
The North Dakota district court held that the inclusion
of personal property in the assessed value of railroad
property does not violate section 1 1503(b)(1) of the 4-R
Act. 67 The court held that business personal property is
not subject to a property tax levy and therefore is not
commercial and industrial property for purposes of the 4-
R Act.68
Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit, however,
(;2 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 11503(a)(4), 11503a(a)(4) (1982), 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1513(d)(2)(D) (1982).
, 492 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. 1980), aff'd, 657 F.2d 204 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1086 (1981).
64 Ogilvie, 657 F.2d at 205.
Ogilvie, 492 F. Supp. at 449. A North Dakota statute provides that "[t]he
assessed value of locally assessed property does not include personal property."
N.D. CErr. CODE § 57-02-08(25) (1983).
6 Ogilvie, 492 F. Supp. at 453.
67 Id. The court agreed with the state which argued that the 4-R Act "does not
deny to the state the power to classify property and to exempt certain classes of
property from taxation." Id.
- Id. As stated earlier, the 4-R Act defines "commercial and industrial prop-
erty" as property devoted to a commercial or industrial use and subject to a prop-
erty tax levy. 49 U.S.C. § 11503(a)(4) (1982).
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held that the 4-R Act was intended to prohibit tax discrim-
ination against rail transportation property in any form
whatsoever. 69 Therefore, North Dakota could not tax rail-
road personal property when it exempted all other com-
mercial and industrial property. 70 The courts found the
tax invalid solely due to the catch-all provision in section
11503(b)(4) of the 4-R Act which prohibits "any other tax
which results in discriminatory treatment of a common
carrier by railroad .... -71 The court of appeals did not,
however, specifically address the question of whether sec-
tion 11503(b)(1) prohibits North Dakota from taxing rail-
road personalty when it exempts other business
personalty.72
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization of
North Dakota,73 three airlines sought relief from property
tax assessments against them.7 ' The airlines alleged that
the state tax scheme, which taxed airline personal prop-
erty while exempting other commercial and industrial
personal property from taxation, was invalid under the
AAIA.v5 The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the
,is, Ogilvie, 657 F.2d at 210. The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court
when it concluded:
The intent of Congress in enacting § 306 was to protect interstate
rail carriers from discriminatory property taxation. The most obvi-
ous form of tax discrimination is to impose a tax on a class of rail
transportation property that is not imposed on other nonrailroad
property of the same class. The inclusion of personal property in
the assessed value of railroad property and other centrally assessed
businesses imposes a personal property tax on centrally assessed
businesses that is not imposed on locally assessed businesses.
Id.
70 Id. The Eighth Circuit found that North Dakota had a long history of tax
discrimination against railroads. Id. The court also found that the state had ample
time to remedy its situation before the 4-R Act became effective. Id. "Not having
done so, the district court ... correctly determined that personal property of the
railroads was exempt from taxation, the same as all other commercial and indus-
trial property .. " Id.
71 Id. at 209; see supra note 46 for a discussion of the "catch-all" provision of the
4-R Act.
72 Ogilvie, 657 F.2d at 210.
71 358 N.W.2d 515 (N.D. 1984).
74 Id. at 515.
7- Id. at 516. With certain exceptions, commercial and industrial personal
property in North Dakota is exempt from personal property taxation. N.D. CErr.
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AAIA prohibits North Dakota from taxing airline person-
alty while exempting other business personalty.76
In Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc. v. Cochran,77 motor
carriers brought an action challenging Tennessee tax as-
sessments.78 The motor carriers sought relief because
their motor carrier property was assessed at one hundred
percent of value while other commercial and industrial
property was presumed not to have value.79 The district
court found Ogilvie controlling. 80 The court interpreted
the Motor Carrier Act to prohibit discrimination against
motor carrier property resulting from the exemption of
"commercial and industrial" personalty owned by other
locally assessed business taxpayers in Tennessee. 8' Ten-
nessee argued that the Motor Carrier Act did not interfere
with the state's power to classify property for purposes of
ad valorem taxation, but the court held that the failure to
tax other commercial and industrial property violated the
provisions of the Motor Carrier Act.8 2
CODE § 57-02-08(25) (1983). The Board assessed the airlines' personal property
at a ratio of ten percent of market value in 1982. Northwest Airlines, 358 N.W.2d at
516; see N.D. CONST. art. X, § 4; N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-02-27(3) (1983).
N Northwest Airlines, 358 N.W.2d at 517. The court justified its holding by stat-
ing that the clear legislative purpose behind 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d) was "to
prohibit states from imposing discriminatory property taxes on air carriers."
Northwest Airlines, 358 N.W.2d at 517. Quoting from Aloha Airlines v. Director of
Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 12 (1983), the court states, "[W]hen a federal statute unam-
biguously forbids the states to impose a particular kind of tax on an industry af-
fecting interstate commerce, courts need not look beyond the plain language of
the federal statute to determine whether a state statute that imposes such a tax is
preempted." Northwest Airlines, 358 N.W.2d at 517.
77 546 F. Supp. 915 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
78 Id. at 917.
79 Id. at 917-18. Pursuant to the Tennessee Business Act, numerous counties
and municipalities in Tennessee adopted the presumption that for those busi-
nesses subject to the business tax, the property is valueless for purposes of per-
sonal property tax. Id. In these counties the local businesses either paid the
business tax or the personal property tax. Id.
so Id. at 918.
f, Id. at 919. "The most obvious form of tax discrimination is to impose a tax
on a class of... transportation property that is not imposed on other ... property
of the same class." Id. (quoting Ogilvie, 492 F. Supp. at 446).
" Id. Since the early 1960s an increasing number of states have established
complete or partial exemptions for major classes of locally assessed business per-
sonalty, while the personalty of centrally assessed interstate carriers has generally
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In Atchison, Topeka & San Francisco Railway v. Arizona,83
railroad companies sought relief from Arizona's allegedly
discriminatory tax practices.84 The railroads argued that
Arizona must consider manufacturers' inventories, ex-
empt from taxation under the Arizona Constitution,
within the category of "commercial and industrial prop-
erty.., subject to a property tax levy" since Arizona could
tax the property if the Arizona citizens amended their
constitution. 5 The court held that "[p]roperty which is
for any reason tax-exempt is excluded as a form of com-
mercial and industrial property. 86
As these cases demonstrate, no clear consensus on the
meaning of "commercial and industrial property" cur-
rently exists. It remains unclear whether a state may tax
airplanes while exempting all other business personal
property without violating the tax antidiscrimination laws.
Similarly, no clear definition of in lieu tax currently exists.
2. In Lieu Tax
Section 1513(d)(3) states that it "shall not apply to any
in lieu tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronau-
tical purposes. 8 7 The meaning of the term "in lieu tax"
is uncertain. Congress apparently decided to exclude a
certain class of in lieu taxes, those "wholly utilized for air-
remained subject to tax. See D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX, 146-49
(1966).
85 559 F. Supp. 1237 (D. Ariz. 1983).
84 Id. at 1240. For years railroads have contended that Arizona placed a heavier
tax burden on them than on other property owners. Id. In 1971, the railroads
unsuccessfully challenged the system that placed them in the category with the
highest rate of assessment. See Apache County v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 106 Ariz.
356, 476 P.2d 657 (1970), appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 1005 (1971).
8-1 Atchison, 559 F. Supp. at 1245. The court found the railroad's interpretation
"simply unreasonable." Id. "Property 'subject to' a tax levy is property which is
presently taxed." Id.
86 Id.; see also ACF Indus., Inc. v. Arizona, 714 F.2d 93, 94 (9th Cir. 1983) (no
authority requires that untaxed property be included in an average of assessed
value for taxed property); Trailer Train Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal.,
687 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1983) (in determining base rate for comparison, crucial
issue is whether tax roll contains majority of state's commercial and industrial
property).
87 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d)(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
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port and aeronautical purposes," from the comparison
standard of the AAIA.8 8
The supreme courts of North Dakota and South Dakota
have been the only courts to consider this portion of the
AAIA.89 North Dakota adopted an amendment to the air
carrier tax one year after the enactment of the AAIA.90
The amendment declared the tax to be in lieu of aircraft
registration fees and sales and use taxes.9' In Northwest
Airlines, the trial court held that regardless of the "in lieu"
label, this new tax was not a substitute for another tax
previously imposed on the airlines.9 2 Therefore, by defi-
nition the tax could not be an in lieu tax. The North Da-
kota Supreme Court upheld the lower court finding that
North Dakota's air carrier transportation property tax was
not an in lieu tax under section 1513(d)(3).9 3
In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Hughes County, 4 the South Da-
kota Supreme Court upheld a lower court holding regard-
ing the validity of the South Dakota tax, but rejected the
circuit court's definition of in lieu tax.95 According to the
circuit court, the South Dakota tax met the two prong test
of the AAIA.9 6 First, the circuit court found that an in lieu
tax determines the exclusive method of taxing a particular
type of property, to the exclusion of all other methods ac-
tually or potentially applicable.9 ' According to the circuit
" Id.
See Northwest Airlines, 358 N.W.2d at 515; Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d at 106.
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-32-01.1 (1983).
Id. "The taxes imposed by . . . this chapter on air carrier transportation
property are in lieu of the registration fees imposed by section 2-05-11 and are in
lieu of sales and use taxes which would otherwise be imposed on the sale, storage,
use or consumption of air carrier transportation property . Id.
" Northwest Airlines, 358 N.W.2d at 518.
11 Id.
1,4 372 N.W.2d 106 (S.D. 1985), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1038 (1987).
Id. at 109.
Jurisdictional Statement, Appendix B at 20a, Western.
1,7 Id. at 19a-20a. The court based this conclusion on S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 10-4-6.1 (1982). Id. ; see supra note 26 for text of this statute. The statute specifi-
cally states that the exemption of personal property from ad valorem taxation
"shall not impair or repeal any tax or fee authorized to be levied or imposed in
lieu of personal property." Id.
The 1975 Report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Coin-
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court, the second prong merely requires that any tax im-
posed be wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical pur-
poses.98  The South Dakota statute also met this
requirement because it specifically provided that all pro-
ceeds should be wholly used for airport purposes. 99
The South Dakota Supreme Court held that the circuit
court had erred in sustaining the tax as an in lieu tax.' 00
The court defined the term "in lieu tax" to mean a tax
that is "instead of, or, a substitute for, and it is not an
additional tax."'' The tax in question was the first impo-
sition of a personal property tax on flight property in
South Dakota. 0 2 Therefore, the South Dakota tax was not
a substitute for an ad valorem personal property tax. 0 3
Nevertheless, the South Dakota Supreme Court af-
firmed on an alternative ground.'0 4 The court found the
tax valid under the balancing test found in section
1513(d)(1).10 5 Under this section, a tax is found discrimi-
natory by comparing the tax rates assessed on aircraft to
the rates applied to other commercial and industrial prop-
erty. 0 6 The AAIA defines "commercial and industrial
property" as property "devoted to commercial or indus-
trial use and subject to a property tax levy."'' 0 7 Because
South Dakota exempted locally assessed business prop-
erty from taxation, the court reasoned that this property
was not "subject to a property tax levy," and therefore
merce on the 4-R Act supports this interpretation. This Report uses "in lieu tax"
to describe special taxes on common carriers that operate differently from the
generally applicable property tax schemes. H.R. REP. No. 725, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 77, 78 (1975).
' Jurisdictional Statement Appendix B at 20a, Western.
Id.
Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d at 109.
Id. (citing BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 832 (5th ed. 1979)).
'0 Id. The court also found that the tax is an additional tax to the personal
property taxes already existing. Id. The court was not persuaded by the reference




,', See 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d)(I)(A),(C) (1982).
107 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d)(2)(D) (1982).
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could not be included as commercial or industrial prop-
erty for comparison purposes under section
1513(d)(1).108
When defining "in lieu tax" the South Dakota Supreme
Court relied upon Lebeck v. State.'0 9 In Lebeck, an Arizona
court refused to enforce a license tax on motor vehicles
purportedly imposed "in lieu of all ad valorem property
taxes on any vehicle subject to such license tax."" 0 The
court held that because plaintiffs' vehicles were engaged
exclusively in interstate commerce, they were not subject
to the ad valorem tax."'I The Lebeck court defined "in lieu
tax" to mean instead of or a substitute for, and not an
additional tax." 2 Therefore, in order to be subject to the
in lieu tax, the property must have been subject to the
previous tax."13 The court found that the motor vehicles
were not subject to a tax in lieu of the ad valorem tax." 4
3. General Rules for the Statutory Construction of the AAIA
As stated earlier, Congress provided little guidance as
to their intent in enacting the AAIA." 5 According to es-
tablished rules of statutory construction, Congress in-
tends legislation enacted to remedy an existing problem
construed in order to effectuate its purpose." 6 Where a
provision is susceptible to alternative interpretations, the
alternative which best serves that purpose is applied."
7
Therefore, the obvious purpose for a law should not be
Hughes County, 372 N.W.2d at 110.
62 Ariz. 171, 156 P.2d 720 (1945).
Id. at 721. "[A] license tax is hereby imposed on vehicles registered for op-
eration upon highways of Arizona, which license tax shall be in lieu of all ad
valorem property taxes on any vehicle subject to such license tax." ARIZ. CONST.
art. 9, § 11.




115 See supra notes 47-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legisla-
tive history for the AAIA.
I- Piedmont & N. Ry. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1932).
,,7 Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 206 (1949).
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sacrificed to a literal interpretation of its words."18 The
law favors a rational and sensible construction. 19
The purpose of section 7 of the ADAA was to "[make]
current law which prohibits the assessment, levying or
collecting of taxes on motor carrier property in a manner
different from that of other commercial and industrial
property, applicable to air carriers."'' 20  Congress un-
doubtedly had this purpose in mind when it amended the
Act and added section 1513(d). l2 ' Clearly, the purpose
was to protect airlines from discriminatory local taxes on
interstate transportation services.' 2 2 Overall, the purpose
of the Act as a whole, and of section 1513(d) in particular,
is to protect airlines operating in interstate commerce
from burdensome and discriminatory taxes. 23
III. WESTERN AIR LINES, INC. V. BOARD OF EQUALIZATION
OF SOUTH DAKOTA - THE SUPREME
COURT'S ANALYSIS
In their appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the
airlines challenged the South Dakota Supreme Court's in-
terpretation of "commercial and industrial property"
under section 1513(d). 24 Following oral argument, the
Supreme Court requested supplemental briefing from the
parties and the Solicitor General on the following ques-
tions: (1) is the question whether a state tax is an "in lieu
2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 46.07 (4th ed. 1984).
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982); United States v.
Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
t20 H.R. CONF. REP. No'. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1190, 1484.
1' 49 U.S.C. app. § 1513(d) (1982); see supra note 7 for full text of section
1513(d).
122 S. REP. No. 12, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 157, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1973). Committees in both Houses of Congress determined
local taxes burden interstate air transportation. S. REP. No. 12, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 20-21 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 157, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1973). Congress
passed the ADAA to deal with these problems. S. REP. No. 12, 93rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 20-21 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 157, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1973).
12-1 S. REP. No. 12, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1973); H.R. REP. No. 157, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1973).
,24 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1042.
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tax which is wholly utilized for airport and aeronautical
purposes," one of state or federal law, and (2) if federal
law governs the question whether a tax is an in lieu tax
under section 1513(d)(3), is the South Dakota Airline
Flight Property Tax an in lieu tax under section
1513(d)(3)? 125
The parties and the Solicitor General agreed that fed-
eral law governs the interpretation of the state tax.12 6
Although the appellants urged that the South Dakota
Supreme Court had incorrectly interpreted "commercial
and industrial property" under the AAIA,' 27 the Court did
not address this issue because it resolved the case based
on its interpretation of in lieu tax under the AAIA. 28
The Court admitted that little legislative history specifi-
cally discussing the in lieu tax provision exists.' 29 The
court specifically rejected an affidavit by John L. Zorack,
an attorney supposedly involved in the passage of the leg-
islation which ultimately became section 1513(d). 3 0 The
appellant submitted this affidavit to lend weight to its ar-
1. Western Air Lines, Inc., v. Board of Equalization of S.D., 107 S. Ct. 451
(1986).
126 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1043. Generally, "absent a clear indication to the con-
trary, the meaning of words in a federal statute is a question of federal law .... "
Id. This is especially true when the federal statute aims to eliminate state discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce. Id.; see, e.g., Aloha Airlines, 464 U.S. at 13-14
(holding that state legislature's characterization of a tax could not shield the tax
from application of another subsection of section 1513).
127 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1042. "Had the South Dakota court paid even the
slightest attention to the legislative history of § 1513(d) ... that court would have
discovered that ... the statutory phrase 'subject to a property tax levy,' was not
intended to allow the sort of wholesale discrimination practiced by South Dakota,
but rather to allow for exclusion from the comparison class of 'commercial and
industrial property' only those limited classes of property which had traditionally
been exempt from state taxation." Appellant's Brief, supra note 5, at 13-14; see
supra notes 60-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the various interpre-
tations of "commercial and industrial property."
128 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1043.
129 Id.; see supra note 97 for the small amount of legislative history that does
exist. The court states that this "sliver of legislative history" supports its interpre-
tation of in lieu tax. Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1043.
-0 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1043. Zorack is described as an attorney who "repre-
sent(s) clients in a variety of legislative matters before the United States Con-
gress." Id. Zorack was apparently involved, in an unexplained capacity, in the
passage of this legislation. Id.
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gument that in order to qualify as an in lieu tax the tax
must be a substitute for other property taxes previously
imposed on airlines. 3 1 Although the Court recognized
this as a possible interpretation of Section 1513(d), the
Court stated that "the attempt at the creation of legisla-
tive history through the post-hoc statements of interested
onlookers is entitled to no weight" in the interpretation
process. 132
Therefore, in keeping with established rules of statu-
tory construction, the Court focused on the 'purpose
and effect' of the state tax in light of the policy embodied
in the federal provision." 133 The Court acknowledged
that section 1513(d) is historically related to similar provi-
sions in the 4-R Act and the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.134
The Western Court found the major purpose of these stat-
utes is to prevent states from excessively taxing "nonvot-
ing, nonresident businesses in order to subsidize general
welfare services for state residents."' 135
Finally, the Supreme Court determined that the "lan-
guage and logic" of the AAIA indicate that the South Da-
kota Airline Flight Property Tax falls under the in lieu
exemption. 136 The Court analyzed section 1513(d)(3) in
1.1 Id. According to Zorack, the in lieu provision "was intended to ensure that
the Act would not invalidate state taxes which are a legitimate substitute for other
taxes on air carrier transportation property and which are not imposed in an effort
to tax such property at rates higher than those imposed on other comparable
commercial and industrial property." Id. Zorack added that the provision was
added in direct response to Minnesota's objection to an earlier version. Id. Min-
nesota's air flight property tax was a substitute for other property taxes previously
imposed on airlines. Id.
1'2 Id.
Id.; see supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text for a discussion of rules
of statutory construction.
134 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1043-44. "The legislative history of the antidiscrimina-
tion provision in the 4-R Act demonstrates Congress' awareness that interstate
carriers 'are easy prey for State and local tax assessors.' " Id. at 1044. (quoting S.
REP. No. 630, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1969)); see supra notes 28-46 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the legislative purpose behind these statutes.
13 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1044; see supra notes 28-46 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the legislative purpose behind these statutes.
136 Western, 107 S. Ct at 1044. The South Dakota tax stands in lieu of the gener-
ally applicable ad valorem property tax assessed on most other commercial and
industrial property in the state at the time the airline flight property tax was estab-
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two parts. First, the tax must be "wholly utilized for air-
port and aeronautical purposes."'13 7 The South Dakota tax
meets this requirement because section 10-29-15 requires
that the taxes collected under this chapter shall be allo-
cated "to the airports where such airline companies make
regularly scheduled landings and shall be used exclusively by
such airports for airport purposes ....
Secondly, the tax must be applied to the exclusion of
any other property tax. m3 9 South Dakota also meets this
requirement because it only assesses the flight property of
airline companies once for taxation purposes.' 40  The
Court reasoned that if the revenues collected pursuant to
the South Dakota tax were specifically used to benefit
those from which the tax is collected, then the tax does
not discriminatorily take from some in order to benefit
others. 4 1 Therefore, the South Dakota tax satisfies the
overall purpose of this antidiscrimination tax
legislation. 142
The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the position
taken by the airlines and the South Dakota Supreme
Court that an in lieu tax means that the tax is a substitute
for an ad valorem personal property tax. 14s The Court
reasoned that if the only criteria for an in lieu tax is that
lished. Id. at 1045; see supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the circuit court's reasoning.
17 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1043.
ism S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 10-29-15 (1982) (emphasis added).
i'.s Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1044.
140 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-29-2 (1982); see supra note 20 for the text of
this statute.
141 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1044.
142 Id. at 1045. "Ihe language of § 1513(d)(3), while at first glance ambigu-
ous, should be interpreted in a manner that comports with the policies of the
Airport and Airline Improvement Act. That interpretation is that § 1513(d)(3)
exempts from the antidiscrimination provisions of § 1513(d)(1) a tax on airline
flight property ... the proceeds of which are wholly utilized for airport and aero-
nautical purposes." Id.
143 Id.; see supra note 100-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
South Dakota Supreme Court's interpretation of the phrase "in lieu tax." The
United States Supreme Court stated, "[t]he illogical results of applying such an
interpretation, however, argue strongly against the conclusion that Congress in-
tended these results when it drafted § 1513(d)(3)." Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1044.
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one tax replaces another tax, then all a state legislature
would have to do is amend its tax code one session, and
then the following session replace that tax with another
tax. 144
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF WESTERN
Despite the unanswered questions left by the Western
opinion, some observations can be made about the possi-
ble effects of the Western holding. 45  First, Western admit-
tedly provides some concrete guidelines for interpreting
Section 1513(d)(3) of the AAIA. 146  Before this decision,
the phrase "in lieu tax" had been construed narrowly.
47
Now an in lieu tax can mean any tax that determines the
exclusive method of taxing a particular type of property,
to the exclusion of all other methods actually or poten-
tially applicable. 48
Secondly, the Western decision did nothing to remove
the confusion surrounding the interpretation of "com-
mercial and industrial property" under the AAIA.' 49 It is
still unclear whether a state can totally exempt all business
inventories from ad valorem taxation and continue to tax
centrally assessed business taxpayers protected by the 4-R
Act, the Motor Carrier Act, and the AAIA.150
144 Id. at 1045. "At worst, the appellant's interpretation of § 1513(d)(3) would
do no more than place a meaningless hurdle before state legislatures seeking to
conform their tax scheme to the requirements of this provision." Id. According
to the court, there is no reason that an in lieu tax must have replaced some other
tax by the effective date of the federal provision. Id. "This exercise of replacing
one tax with another, while contributing somewhat to a state legislature's work-
load, would contribute nothing to the policies of the [AAIA]." Id.
145 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. The Court never addressed the
question of the interpretation of "commercial and industrial property." Western,
107 S. Ct. at 1043.
146 Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1045.
147 See supra notes 87-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differ-
ent interpretations of "in lieu tax."
1" See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 60-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different
interpretations of "commercial and industrial property."
1-10 See supra notes 60-86 for a discussion of this problem. Rail car companies
which operate in Florida are currently facing this sort of discrimination. Amici
Curiae Brief of Railway Progress Institute & Association of American Railroads at
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If other states act upon this interpretation of AAIA, it
could significantly impact an air carriers' ability to operate
within a state. This decision undoubtedly increases the
amount of taxes states may impose upon air carriers. By
the same token, it opens up new ways of financing new
(and old) public airports. This will be particularly signifi-
cant in smaller cities and states whose airports are not
self-supporting.
Finally, Western's overall impact on state and local taxa-
tion schemes remains uncertain. Since the court only
dealt with one small exception to the federal antidis-
crimination laws, 15' it is still unclear whether or not states
may totally exempt certain property from ad valorem tax-
ation and continue to tax interstate carriers. On the other
hand, it does expose one loophole in the federal statutory
scheme. 15 2
V. CONCLUSION
Arguably, the Supreme Court may have gutted a major
provision of the AAIA and thereby defeated well-estab-
lished Congressional intent. Congress clearly stated a de-
sire to protect interstate carriers from state discriminatory
taxation. The Court's opinion generally provides that air
carriers are fair targets for state property taxation as long
as the tax is applied to the exclusion of any other property
tax,15 3 and the proceeds are used exclusively for airport or
aeronautical purposes. 154
14, Western. Effective January 1, 1982, Florida totally exempted all business inven-
tories from ad valorem taxation. Id. The Florida Department of Revenue refused
to account for the effect of these totally exempt business inventories upon the
overall level of assessment of business personalty when calculating the average
level of assessment of commercial and industrial property for the 1982 tax year.
Id.
1. Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1043-1045.
1-52 See supra notes 87-114 and accompanying text for a discussion of this loop-
hole, the in lieu tax.
." See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
'. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning is logical. 1 5 Realis-
tically, the airlines are not at risk of harm when the aircraft
tax proceeds are wholly used for airport purposes. The
opinion serves as a reminder that statutory interpretation
is far from a science. Courts must always look to the pol-
icy embodied in the statute. 15 6 Western also illustrates that
courts must apply common sense when testing possible
meanings of a phrase or section of a statute. 157
For these reasons, Western represents a notable opinion.
Nonetheless, the case does have some weaknesses. The
Court completely sidesteps the question of whether or not
a state may totally exempt most commercial and industrial
property and continue to tax interstate carriers.'5 8 Hope-
fully, the Western decision will prompt new guidance from
Congress and will not be viewed merely as one narrow
exception to the federal scheme prohibiting discrimina-
tory taxation of interstate carriers.
Jean H. Bender
See supra notes 141-142 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Court's reasoning.
,- Western, 107 S. Ct. at 1043.
1-57 Id. at 1044.
1," Id. at 1043; see supra notes 60-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the various interpretations of "commercial and industrial property."
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